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Judicial Review and Constitutional 
Interpretation in Afghanistan: A Case of 
Inconsistency* 
BY SHOAIB TIMORY** 
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
Constitutionalism and separation of powers are distinct features of 
modern democracies.1 While democratic constitutions attempt to divide 
authorities and responsibilities between the branches of the state as 
clearly as possible, differences exist and state branches sometimes 
trespass on the territory of other branches out of self-interest.2 This 
trespass sometimes results in confrontation between the branches or 
violation of individuals’ fundamental rights. To deter such 
infringements, judicial review emerged as a mechanism for protecting 
the supremacy of the constitution.3  
In 1803, Marbury v. Madison was the first critical instance of 
exercising judicial review and soon thereafter, a large number of 
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 1. Aileen Kavanagh, The Constitutional Separation of Powers, in PHILOSOPHICAL 
FOUNDATIONS OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 221, 221-23 (Dyzenhaus David & Malcolm Thorburn 
eds., 2016). 
 2. Id. at 223. 
 3. Id.  
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countries followed the concept with variations in style and detail.4 
Today, we witness the emergence of two main forms of judicial review: 
the European model and the American model.5 Under the European 
model, a centralized body ensures constitutionality of laws and 
government acts and protects the fundamental rights of citizens.6 Under 
the American model, the ordinary courts ensure constitutionality of bills 
in the context of ongoing litigation.7 While the structure and authorities 
vary from one country to another, states ensure the basic mechanisms, 
such as review by third parties and the opportunity to request 
constitutional review by more than one party, are in existence. 
Historically, constitutional supremacy has been recognized in 
nearly all constitutions of Afghanistan; however, a full-fledged judicial 
review system has never emerged.8 Elements of judicial review 
appeared in nearly all of the six short-lived constitutions of Afghanistan 
in the twentieth century.9 The 2004 Constitution is not in any better 
shape.10 Sixteen years since promulgation of Constitution of 2004, the 
flaws and weaknesses of the inherited judicial review system are 
exposed.11  
The Afghanistan Supreme Court conducts judicial review at the 
request of the government or the courts.12 However, the practice of 
judicial review after 2004 has been inconsistent. A quick look at how 
the Supreme Court is making judicial review and interpretation 
decisions reveals that the only common element among those decisions 
is inconsistency. While there is some clarity on the subject of 
constitutional review and the role of the Supreme Court, the topic of 
constitutional interpretation is more controversial. On one hand, the 
Supreme Court has held that constitutional interpretation is a part of its 
authority; however, on the other hand, some claim this authority can be 
 
 4. MAARTJE DE VISSER, CONSTITUTIONAL REVIEW IN EUROPE: A COMPARATIVE 
ANALYSIS (2014). 
 5. GHIZAAL HARESS, JUDICIAL REVIEW IN AFGHANISTAN: A FLAWED PRACTICE 5-6 (Afg. 
Research & Evaluation Unit ed., 2017); Devashri Sinha, Constitutional Review: A Critical Study 
of American Model and European Model, 2016 INDIAN L. INST. L. REV. 158, 158. 
 6. VISSER, supra note 4, at 95.  
 7. Margaret L. Moses, Beyond Judicial Activism: When the Supreme Court is No Longer a 
Court, 14 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 161, 163 (2011). 
 8. This article uses the terms “constitutional review” and “judicial review” 
interchangeably. J. Alexander Thier, The Making of a Constitution in Afghanistan, 51 N.Y.L. 
SCH. L. REV. 558, 564 (2007). 
 9. HARESS, supra note 5, at 7-8.  
 10. Thier, supra note 8, at 579. 
 11. Id. at 572.  
 12. QANUN-I ASSASI-YE JAMHURI-YE ISLAMI AFGHANISTAN [CONSTITUTION OF 
AFGHANISTAN] of 2004 (Afg.) [hereinafter 2004 CONSTITUTION OF AFGHANISTAN].  
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delegated to the Independent Commission for Overseeing 
Implementation of the Constitution (“ICOIC”) because the Constitution 
is not offering a clear viewpoint on this topic.13  
This article gives a detailed account of the legal framework, 
application, examples, and flaws of judicial review and constitutional 
interpretation in Afghanistan and concludes that the current model of 
judicial review is not responsive to the growing demands of the legal 
sector and it is essential that judicial review undergo substantial 
reforms. The following summarizes key recommendations of the article: 
1. Given the importance of the subject matter, the reforms to 
judicial review and constitutional interpretation should come 
through a constitutional amendment process that clarifies the 
role of each relevant entity in conducting judicial review.  
2. One option is to make modifications in the existing Supreme 
Court model. Setting forth a clear role for the Supreme Court 
to interpret the Constitution, designing a separate mechanism 
for judicial review of international treaties and government 
regulations, and clarification on ensuring Sharia compliant-
legislation are examples of the required modifications.  
3. A more preferred option is to replace the current model of 
constitutional review with the European model. The European 
model would not only address the constitutionality of acts but 
also address the constitutionality of the political questions 
frequently raised in Afghanistan.   
4. Until a revision of the constitutional review model takes 
place through the marathon process of a constitutional 
amendment, it is necessary that both the Supreme Court and 
the ICOIC reach an agreement, followed by either an 
introduction of new legislation or amendment of the existing 
legislation, to bring some clarity on their roles and 
responsibilities.  
INTRODUCTION 
In modern democracies, constitutions adhere to the principles of 
separation of power and assign authorities to different branches of the 
state accordingly. Even though division of authorities is mentioned 
explicitly in most constitutions, the conflict between the branches 
sometimes becomes unavoidable due to different interpretations of laws 
and the constitution, which might result in one branch trespassing into 
the territory of the other.  
 
 13. HARESS, supra note 5, at 14-16. 
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Judicial review, or the authority to review the constitutionality of 
legislation or governmental acts, is one of the features of modern 
democratic governments. A theory of judicial review based on 
separation of power requires the reviewing bodies to insist on adherence 
to the principle of separation of powers whenever the government or 
legislature seeks derogation of constitutional values. Therefore, judicial 
review is based on the notion that the constitution is superior to the 
other laws and administrative decisions. In addition, because 
constitutions generally outline fundamental rights of citizens, judicial 
review is considered a key factor in upholding the fundamental rights of 
the citizens. 
There are two main forms of judicial or constitutional review 
practiced around the world.14 The United States first introduced the 
decentralized model of judicial review.15 The landmark Marbury v. 
Madison case in 1803 introduced the concept of judicial review and 
supremacy of the United States Constitution at the federal level.16 Based 
on the American model, the courts, at any level, can review the 
constitutionality of acts when they decide cases before them.17 Under 
this model, the judges are of high caliber and have a comprehensive 
understanding of constitutional values and principles.  
The European model, which is also known as the Kelsenian model, 
named after its Austrian founder, is the other primary type of judicial 
review.18 Under this model, one centralized body, like a court or council 
that sits outside the judicial system, reviews the constitutionality of 
laws.19 Though Hans Kelsen introduced this type of judicial review for 
Austria, many countries around the world, such as Germany and Italy, 
followed suit and applied this centralized type of judicial review.20  
Based on the time the review is taking place, judicial review is 
divided into priori review and posterior review.21 Priori review takes 
place before the legislation is put into effect.22 For instance, if the 
 
 14. MARTIN M. SHAPIRO & ALEC STONE SWEET, ON LAW, POLITICS, AND 
JUDICIALIZATION (2002). 
 15. VISSER, supra note 4, at 94. 
 16. See Martin T. Manton, The Doctrine of Judicial Review, 8 N.Y. ST. B. ASS’N BULL. 205, 
207 (1936).  
 17. VISSER, supra note 4, at 94.  
 18. Id. at 95.  
 19. Id.  
 20. TOM GINSBURG, JUDICIAL REVIEW IN NEW DEMOCRACIES: CONSTITUTIONAL COURTS 
IN ASIAN CASES 9 (2003) (Ginsburg enlists a list of seventy-one new democracies out of which 
forty-two have one type of constitutional review body in place). 
 21. VISSER, supra note 4, at 96. 
 22. Id. 
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legislation passed by the parliament is reviewed before the final 
signature, it is a form of priori review.23 On the other hand, if review is 
only possible after the legislation is put into effect, it is called posterior 
review.24 Scholars also categorize judicial review as abstract review, 
concrete review, or individual challenge based on the nature and type of 
review.25 If the reviewing body conducts the review without 
consideration of litigation, it is called abstract review.26 Concrete review 
takes place as part of ongoing litigation.27 In some countries, individuals 
can also file a request in which they challenge the constitutionality of a 
government act or legislation.28  
This article examines whether Afghanistan has followed the 
American or the European model of judicial review and whether 
judicial review has been successful. The article begins by looking at the 
history of judicial review in Afghanistan and then examines the 
application of judicial review and its challenges under the Afghan 
Constitution of 2004. This article also explores the subject of 
constitutional interpretation and the reasons it has been portrayed as a 
controversial matter in recent years. Based on the lessons learned after 
2004, the author provides his recommendations on enhancement of the 
judicial review in Afghanistan.  
I.  PART ONE: HISTORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW IN AFGHANISTAN 
A.  Judicial Review Before 2004 
Abdul Rahman Khan (1880-1901) was the first ruler of 
Afghanistan to initiate the establishment of modern state courts beside 
Sharia courts.29 For the most part between the 1880s and 1960s, 
Afghanistan continued the tradition of having a dual court system: 
Sharia courts handled matters like criminal law, family law and personal 
law, and the state courts decided matters like tax, commerce, and civil 
service.30 Afghanistan did not have a constitution or recognize the 
 
 23. Id. 
 24. THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF LAW AND POLITICS 131 (Keith E. Whittington, R. Daniel 
Kelemen & Gregory A. Calderia eds., 2008). 
 25. Id.  
 26. Id. 
 27. Id. 
 28. Id. 
 29. Ramin Moschtaghi, Organization and Jurisdiction of Newly Established Afghan Courts 
– The Compliance of the Formal System of Justice with the Bonn Agreement, 10 MAX PLANCK 
Y.B. U.N. L. 531 (2006), http://www.mpil.de/files/pdf3/mpunyb_12_ramin.pdf.  
 30. J. Alexander Thier, Reestablishing the Judicial System in Afghanistan 5 (Ctr. on 
Democracy, Dev., and Rule of Law, Stanford Inst. for Int’l Studies, Working Paper No. 19, 
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concept of separation of powers until achieving independence in 1919.31 
Abdul Rahman Khan and his successor, Habibullah Khan, relied on 
their own creeds and decrees to run the country.32  
After the 1919 Independence War, King Amanullah introduced the 
first Constitution of Afghanistan in 1923.33 That Constitution did not 
foresee the establishment of a parliament.34 Following the examples of 
France and Egypt, the 1923 Constitution established a Council of State 
that had two main duties: first, to review the text of laws before the 
Council of Ministers approve them; and second, to act as the Higher 
Court for civil service disputes.35 The 1923 Constitution also authorized 
the Council of State to explain and interpret any article of the 
Constitution or other laws followed by the approval of the Council of 
Ministers.36 There is no evidence, however, that indicates the Council of 
State exercised this power. Though the main purpose of review of laws 
by the State Council was to improve the quality of laws, the process 
could be seen as a semi-priori review of laws against the Constitution. 
The constitutions that came into existence after the 1923 Constitution 
possessed some elements of judicial review, but none introduced a 
robust mechanism.  
The 1931 Constitution that created a legislature for the first time 
lacked any reference to judicial review except for containing a 
repugnancy clause. Article 65 stated that legislative documents adopted 
by the National Assembly shall not be repugnant to principles of Islam 
or the policy of the government;37 however, it failed to mention any 
mechanism for ensuring adherence to the repugnancy clause.38 Given 
the advisory role of the National Assembly, it was not a surprise that 
such a mechanism was lacking. The first two constitutions of 
Afghanistan were weak documents that did not clearly define the 
structure of the state and separation of power.39 A real legislative branch 
 
2004), https://www.fsi-live.s3.us-west-1.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/Reestablishing_the_
Judiciary_in_Afghanistan.pdf. 
 31. Constitutional History of Afghanistan, ENCYCLOPAEDIA IRANICA, http://www.
iranicaonline.org/articles/constitutional-history-of-afghanistan (last visited Oct. 11, 2018).  
 32. Moschtaghi, supra note 29. 
 33. Id. 
 34. Constitutional History of Afghanistan, supra note 31. 
 35. SARWAR DANISH, HUQOQ EDRAI AFGHANISTAN [THE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW OF 
AFGHANISTAN] (Kabul: Ibn Sina Higher Education Institute Publications, 2013). 
 36. NEZAMNAMEH-I ASSASI-YE DAWLAT ALIAH AFGHANISTAN [CONSTITUTION OF 
AFGHANISTAN] of 1923 (Afg.) [hereinafter 1923 CONSTITUTION OF AFGHANISTAN].  
 37. OSOUL-I ASSASI-YE DAWLAT-I ALIAH AFGHANISTAN [CONSTITUTION OF 
AFGHANISTAN] of 1931 (Afg.) Art. 65 [hereinafter 1931 CONSTITUTION OF AFGHANISTAN]. 
 38. Id. 
 39. HARESS, supra note 5, at 7.  
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was not in place to create legislation that could be repugnant to the 
Constitution or Sharia and thus there was no possibility of conflict 
between the legislative and executive branch.  
By 1963, King Zahir Shah (1933-1973) began his reform plan in 
order to democratize the country by establishing separation of branches 
and decreasing the power of the Monarch and the Royal Family.40 For 
the first time, the 1964 Constitution—considered as the finest 
constitution of the Muslim world at the time of its introduction41—
declared the judiciary an “independent organ of the State which charges 
its duties side by side with the Legislative and Executive Organs.”42 In 
addition, a consolidated and unified judicial system, at the top of which 
was the Supreme Court, took its place in the Constitution.43 The 
Constitution and the laws were also declared as the dominant sources 
for decision-making in the courts, and Sharia law (Hanafi School of 
Jurisprudence) could be applied only if a rule was not found in the 
Constitution or in the ordinary laws.44 Recognized as an independent 
organ, the judiciary was the real winner of the 1964 Constitution. The 
current structure of the judiciary resembles the same structure that the 
1964 Constitution introduced.  
The 1964 Constitution tagged the King as the guardian of the 
Constitution.45 It also contained a repugnancy clause stating that no law 
shall be against the principles of Islam or other values enshrined in the 
Constitution.46 The 1964 Constitution, however, did not have a clear 
reference to a judicial review mechanism. To fill in the gap, the 1967 
Law of Jurisdiction and Organization of the Courts provided that the 
Supreme Court has the power to abstain from applying laws repugnant 
to the provisions of the Constitution and to interpret laws at the time of 
implementation.47 Interviews and research,48 however, show that the 
Supreme Court failed to exercise a single case of judicial review.49  
 
 40. Reestablishing the Judicial System in Afghanistan, supra note 30, at 5. 
 41. LOUIS DUPREE, AFGHANISTAN 565 (3d ed. 1980).  
 42. QANUN-I ASSASI-YE JAMHURI-YE ISLAMI AFGHANISTAN [CONSTITUTION OF 
AFGHANISTAN] of 1964 (Afg.) art. 97 [hereinafter 1964 CONSTITUTION OF AFGHANISTAN]. 
 43. Reestablishing the Judicial System in Afghanistan, supra note 30, at 10.  
 44. 1964 CONSTITUTION OF AFGHANISTAN, supra note 42, at art. 102. 
 45. Id. at art. 7. 
 46. Id. at art. 64.  
 47. Afghanistan Law of the Jurisdiction and Organization of the Courts, AFGHANISTAN 
OFFICIAL GAZETTE No. 89, Art. 13.a. 1-2 (1967) (Afg.) [hereinafter 1967 Afghanistan Law of the 
Courts]. 
 48. Interview with Mohammad Sediq Zhobl, Directorate Gen. of Scrutiny and Perusal, 
Supreme Court (Jan. 10, 2018) (on file with author).  
 49. See generally Martin Lau, Islamic Law and the Afghan Legal System (May 30, 2003), 
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The 1976 Constitution that was ratified during the first Republic 
also had a repugnancy clause.50 Article 135 gave the authority of 
interpretation of the Constitution to the Supreme Court.51 However, 
before the President established the Supreme Court, the communists’ 
coup in 1978 changed the regime. The new regime set aside the 
Constitution and started ruling the country by decrees until a new 
Constitution was introduced in 1980.52 The first constitution of the 
Communist Regime authorized the Executive Board of the 
Revolutionary Council to interpret the law but it lacked a clause 
allowing judicial review.53 
It was not until 1987 that a constitution in Afghanistan 
incorporated different aspects of constitutional review.54 In addition to a 
repugnancy clause that stated that no law shall be against the principles 
of Islam or other values enshrined in the Constitution,55 the 1987 
Constitution introduced a French-style model of judicial review. This 
was the first time an Afghan constitution introduced a robust, but still 
flawed, mechanism for review of legislation. Chapter Ten of the 1987 
Constitution was devoted to the Constitutional Council.56  
The Constitutional Council was composed of a chairperson and 
eight members.57 The President appointed the members for a term of six 
years.58 The amendments to the Constitution in 1990 changed the 
composition of the Constitutional Council by adding deputy and 
secretary positions, increasing the number of Council members to 
eleven.59 The Council was accountable to the President and was obliged 
to report to him.60 The role of the President in appointing the council 
members and accountability of the Council to the President clearly 
negated any claim of independence of the Council. Thus, the Council 
 
https://www.eprints.lse.ac.uk/28366/1/Lau_LSERO_version.pdf, (unpublished conference paper) 
(on file with London School of Economics Research Online). 
 50. QANUN-I ASSASI-YE DAWLAT-I JAMHURI-YE AFGHANISTAN [CONSTITUTION OF 
AFGHANISTAN] of 1976 (Afg.) art. 64 [hereinafter 1976 CONSTITUTION OF AFGHANISTAN].  
 51. Id. at art. 135. 
 52. Constitutional History of Afghanistan, supra note 31. 
 53. OSOUL-I ASSASI-YE JAMHURI-YE DEMOCRATIC AFGHANISTAN [CONSTITUTION OF 
AFGHANISTAN] of 1980 (Afg.) [hereinafter 1980 CONSTITUTION OF AFGHANISTAN].  
 54. Constitutional History of Afghanistan, supra note 31. 
 55. QANUN-I ASSASI-YE JAMHURI-YE AFGHANISTAN [CONSTITUTION OF AFGHANISTAN] of 
1987 (Afg.) [hereinafter 1987 CONSTITUTION OF AFGHANISTAN].  
 56. Id. at art. 125. 
 57. Id. 
 58. Id.  
 59. QANUN-I ASSASI-YE JAMHURI-YE AFGHANISTAN [CONSTITUTION OF AFGHANISTAN] of 
1990 (Afg.) [hereinafter 1990 CONSTITUTION OF AFGHANISTAN].  
 60. 1987 CONSTITUTION OF AFGHANISTAN, supra note 55, at art. 126.  
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had only an advisory role. This was proof that the Constitution only 
copied the physical features of the French model of judicial review. The 
entity lacked the independence exercised by similar entities in the 
democratic world.  
Putting aside the critics, the main objective of the establishment of 
the Council was to ensure the constitutionality of laws, legislative 
documents, and international treaties.61 In addition, the Constitutional 
Council had a duty to provide legal and judicial opinions to the 
President on matters related to implementation of the Constitution.62 
The Council could also share its recommendations on effective 
execution of legislative documents prescribed by the Constitution with 
the President.63 The Council had a long list of duties; however, due to 
the advisory nature of its decisions, it lacked the power to overturn 
unconstitutional documents. As per Article 124 of the 1987 
Constitution, the Constitutional Council had a priori review authority.64 
This Article and the text of Constitutional Council Law reveal that the 
ruling of the Council on such matters was advisory in nature and it was 
up to the President to consider or ignore the Council’s opinions.65  
The Council also had the authority for posteriori review of the 
legislative documents at the request of rights protecting entities, other 
state institutions, and individuals.66 It was required that organizations 
and individuals share their questions with the Constitutional Council 
and if the Council agreed with the unconstitutionality of the legislative 
document, the Council would send its proposal for abolishment of the 
legislative document to the President.67 Despite its lack of authority in 
enforcing its opinions, the range of institutions and accessibility of 
individuals to the Constitutional Council was revolutionary.  
The records of the Ministry of Justice show that the Constitutional 
Council issued fifty-six opinions on different legislative documents.68 
Out of those cases, the Constitutional Council announced 
constitutionality of forty-two of the legislative documents, declared 
twelve of the legislative documents unconstitutional, and the Council 
 
 61. Id. at art. 122.  
 62. Id. at art. 123.  
 63. Id. at art. 124.  
 64. Id.  
 65. Law on Constitutional Council, AFGHANISTAN OFFICIAL GAZETTE No. 682, art. 12 
(1988) (Afg.). 
 66. Id.  
 67. Id.  
 68. OFFICIAL GAZETTE, (last visited Oct. 11, 2018) (Afg.). 
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provided its opinion as a commentary on two other subjects.69 The 
opinions of the Council included a variety of subjects that came from 
different entities, groups, and even individuals.70 While the Constitution 
required a party to ask for review of the constitutionality of legislative 
documents, the Constitutional Council, without being asked, provided 
an opinion defining the term “urgent need” for approval of a legislative 
decree by the government during the recess of the National Assembly.71 
This was an indication that the Council wanted to take initiative and 
expand its jurisdiction beyond what the Constitution and the Council’s 
Law had mandated.  
In one of its first decisions, the Constitutional Council announced 
that a number of articles of the Law on National Assembly were 
unconstitutional.72 The relevant unconstitutional articles restricted 
candidacy for leadership positions in the two houses of the National 
Assembly to only candidates of political parties. In addition, the 
Council stated that articles of the Law on the following subjects are 
unconstitutional: (1) the requirement of two-thirds majority vote to hold 
a non-public session of the National Assembly, (2) declaring opinions 
of the Senate over the national budget as advisory, and (3) expansion of 
the oversight authority of the National Assembly over the judiciary.73 
The Council shared the opinion with the President, who returned the 
law back to the National Assembly, based on that opinion.74 Another 
case concerns the decision of the Council of Ministers for waiving tax-
related penalties. The Constitutional Council rejected the decision, 
calling it unconstitutional since only the President had such an authority 
according to the Constitution.75 There has also been one request from an 
employee of the Supreme Court who believed Article 32 of the Civil 
Servants Law on implementation of illegal orders of their supervisors is 
violating Article 42 of the Constitution, which asks for implementation 
of orders of the senior officials.76 The concerned individual did not send 
the request directly to the Council; rather, he shared his request with the 
High Council of the Supreme Court and the Supreme Court sent the 
 
 69. Id. 
 70. Id. 
 71. Constitutional Council Opinion, AFGHANISTAN OFFICIAL GAZETTE No. 682 (1989) 
(Afg.) [hereinafter 1989 Constitutional Council Opinion]. 
 72. See id. 
 73. Id. at 11.  
 74. Id. at 26.  
 75. Id. at 16-17.  
 76. Id. at 18-20. 
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request to the Constitutional Council.77 Ultimately, the Constitutional 
Council struck down the request and declared the relevant article of the 
Civil Servants Law as constitutional.78 The Constitutional Council also 
faced a question concerning Sharia. In 1988, the Women's Association 
of Afghanistan requested the Constitutional Council to declare a number 
of articles of the Civil Code related to divorce unconstitutional since 
those articles undermined the equality of men and women, a principle 
recognized under Article 38 of the Constitution.79 The Constitutional 
Council, after explaining how men and women could apply for divorce 
under the Civil Code, which is based on Sharia, rejected the request.80 
Though the Constitutional Council reviewed a considerable 
number of laws, the biggest flaw was the advisory role of the Council 
and its inability to enforce its findings.81 Therefore, the impact of this 
short-lived Council was minimal, and the safeguards against violation 
of the Constitution were weak and ignorable.  
It is worth mentioning that while the Constitutional Council had 
the power of constitutional review, the Constitution had authorized the 
National Assembly to interpret the ordinary laws.82 This was not 
strange, at least in the region. In Iran, the Guardian Council of the 
Constitution ensures compliance of legislation with Sharia and 
Constitution,83 while the parliament interprets its own passed-laws.84  
The Taliban regime did not have a constitution or they did not 
introduce it publicly, and they did not announce the abolishment of 
previous constitutions either. However, in a rather interesting action, the 
Taliban slightly revised the previously enforced Constitutional Council 
Law and published the law in the Official Gazette.85 The so-called 
Constitutional Council of the Taliban was supposed to work under the 
auspices of the Administrative Office of the Taliban Government.86 
Article 2 of that law authorized the Constitutional Council to ensure 
 
 77. Id. at 20. 
 78. Constitutional Council Opinion, AFGHANISTAN OFFICIAL GAZETTE No. 763 (1992) 
(Afg.) [hereinafter 1992 Constitutional Council Opinion].  
 79. 1989 Constitutional Council Opinion at 31.  
 80. Id.  
 81. Lau, supra note 49 (manuscript at 219). 
 82. 1987 CONSTITUTION OF AFGHANISTAN, supra note 54. 
 83. QANUNI ASSASI JUMHURII ISLAMAI IRAN [THE CONSTITUTION OF THE ISLAMIC 
REPUBLIC OF IRAN] 1979 art. 91 [hereinafter 1979 CONSTITUTION OF IRAN]. 
 84. Id. at art. 73.  
 85. Law on Constitutional Council, AFGHANISTAN OFFICIAL GAZETTE No. 797 (2001) 
(Afg.). 
 86. Law on Constitutional Council (Taliban Regime), AFGHANISTAN OFFICIAL GAZETTE 
No. 797 (2001) (Afg.). 
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compatibility of laws, other legislative documents and international 
treaties with Sharia.87 It is unknown whether the Constitutional Council 
was ever established or reviewed any legislative document for its 
compatibility with Sharia. Interviews with individuals who are familiar 
with the institutions at the time of the Taliban indicate that only one 
individual, Mohammad Musa Nohmat, who had been a member of the 
Constitutional Council before the collapse of the communist regime, 
continued to have his previous title at the time of the Taliban regime, 
though he did not have any authority.88  
The review of previous Afghan Constitutions reveals that a full-
fledged system of constitutional review was never in place.89 At times, 
there were elements of a Supreme Court model of judicial review 
introduced like the one under the 1976 Constitution of Daud Khan. On 
the other hand, the 1987 Constitution established a constitutional 
council similar to that of France. However, unlike its French 
counterpart, Afghanistan’s Constitutional Council had a shorter 
lifespan, was not independent, and was dysfunctional due to the 
collapse of the regime.90  
B.  Judicial Review Under the 2004 Constitution 
Compared to previous constitutions of Afghanistan, the 
Constitution of 2004 has recognized a vast range of fundamental rights 
and liberties and it has tried to create a government of separation of 
power. The Judiciary is an independent organ of the State and has three 
tiers of courts: primary courts, appeals courts, and the Supreme Court as 
the highest organ of the judiciary.91 The legislature has extensive power 
and is mandated to oversee the Executive using different means. To 
summarize, this Constitution designs a system of checks and balances 
that creates an unprecedented democratic system of governance.  
While the 1987 Constitution had introduced a constitutional review 
mechanism similar to that of France, the 2004 Constitution derogates 
from that tradition. The 2004 Constitution gives the Supreme Court the 
power to ensure conformity of the laws, legislative decrees, inter-state 
treaties as well as international covenants with the Constitution and 
their interpretation.92 There are limitations on who and what entities can 
 
 87. Id. at 11. 
 88. Interview with Mohammada Gul Koochay, Dir. of Monitoring, Office of Chief of Staff 
to the President (Jan. 3, 2018) (on file with author). 
 89. HARESS, supra note 5, at 10.  
 90. Constitutional History of Afghanistan, supra note 31. 
 91. 2004 CONSTITUTION OF AFGHANISTAN, supra note 12, at art. 116.  
 92. Id. at art. 121.  
FINAL_FOR_JCI   5/19/2020  5:45 AM 
2019] Constitutional Interpretation in Afghanistan 235 
ask for a review of constitutionality. Article 121 only authorizes the 
government and the courts to submit requests for constitutional 
review.93 Besides, the Constitution requires passage of a law that will 
regulate the practical details of the judicial review and interpretation.94 
This law is yet to be introduced, though some aspects of judicial review 
and interpretation are addressed in the new draft Law of Organization 
and Jurisdiction of the Judiciary.95  
During the 2004 Constitutional Loya Jirga, judicial review 
appeared to be a contentious issue.96 The Constitutional Drafting 
Commission had suggested a Constitutional Court be established to 
ensure conformity of laws and other legislative decrees with the 
constitution.97 The draft Constitution had outlined the judicial review 
and authority to conduct interpretation of the Constitution and other 
legislative decrees quite clearly.98 The following text is an excerpt from 
Chapter 8 of the Draft Constitution:  
Chapter Eight—Draft Constitution of Afghanistan  
Article 141: The Supreme Constitutional Court of Islamic 
Republic of Afghanistan, in accordance with the provisions of 
this chapter, shall supervise the compliance of laws with the 
Constitution. 
Article 142: The Supreme Constitutional Court shall consist of 
6 members, appointed by the President and approved by 
Mishrano Jirga [the Upper House] for one term of 9 years. The 
President shall appoint one member as the Head. The 
organization and authorities of the Supreme Constitutional 
Court shall be regulated by law. 
Article 143: Member of the Supreme Constitutional Court shall 
have the following qualifications: 
1. Be a citizen of Afghanistan and shall not hold citizenship of 
another country. 
2. Shall have higher education in law or [Islamic] 
jurisprudence. 
 
 93. 2004 CONSTITUTION OF AFGHANISTAN, supra note 12, at art. 121. 
 94. Id.  
 95. Draft Law on Jurisdiction and Organization of the Judiciary, (2018) (Afg.) (on file with 
author). 
 96. Shamshad Pasarlay, Constitutional Interpretation and Constitutional Review in 
Afghanistan: Is There Still a Crisis?, I-CONNECT: BLOG (Mar. 18, 2015), http://www.
iconnectblog.com/2015/03/constitutional-interpretation-and-constitutional-review-in-afghanistan-
is-there-still-a-crisis/. 
 97. Id. 
 98. Thier, supra note 8, at 579.  
FINAL_FOR_JCI   5/19/2020  5:45 AM 
236 Loy. L.A. Int’l & Comp. L. Rev. [Vol. 42:2 
3. Shall have minimum ten years of legal, judicial, or 
legislative experience. 
4. Shall have completed 40 years of age. 
5. Shall not have been convicted of crimes against humanity, 
felony, or deprivation of civil rights. 
Article 144: The Supreme Constitutional Court shall have the 
following authorities: 
1. Review of laws, legislative decrees, inter-state treaties, and 
international covenants for their compliance with the 
constitution. 
2. Interpretation of the Constitution, laws, and legislative 
decrees. 
Article 145: In considering a case, if one of the courts 
ascertains that the provision of the law applicable to the case, 
is contrary to the Constitution, the court shall suspend the case 
and refer the matter to the Supreme Constitutional Court. 
This provision is also applicable if one of the parties to the 
case claims such contradictions, provided that it is approved by 
the court. 
In case the Human Rights Commission of Afghanistan finds a 
provision of the law incompatible with the fundamental rights 
enshrined in this constitution, it can refer the matter to the 
Supreme Constitutional Court. 
Article 146: Legislative documents found contrary to the 
Constitution, by the Supreme Constitutional Court, are void. 
The ruling of the Supreme Constitutional Court is final and not 
subject to review, [and] is enforced once published in the 
official gazette.99  
This chapter provided a clear definition and mechanism for 
judicial review and interpretation. It also provided a clear path for 
courts and individuals to challenge the constitutionality of various 
legislative documents.  
Once the Draft Constitution was submitted for review to Hamid 
Karzai, the then Head of the Transitional Government, he and his 
cabinet did not agree with the establishment of an independent court to 
ensure constitutionality.100 Some argue that Hamid Karzai was afraid of 
a possible tension between the branches and the possible limitation a 
Constitutional Court could impose on the next President of the country. 
 
 99. SARWAR DANISH, HUQUQ-I ASSAS-I AFGHANISTAN [AFGHANISTAN CONSTITUTIONAL 
LAW] (Kabul: Ibn-e-Sina Institute of Higher Education, 3rd ed. 2015) (on file with author). 
 100. Pasarlay, supra note 96. 
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Others argue he was advised not to accept that institution since it might 
function like the Guardian Council of Iran, which frequently limits the 
power of the executive and legislature.101 
In the Draft Constitution that was published in late 2003 and 
distributed to Constitutional Loya Jirga for discussion and approval, the 
authority of judicial review, in its initial form, was scrapped and was 
awarded to the Supreme Court. Article 121 of the Draft Constitution 
distributed to Constitutional Loya Jirga members reads as follows: “At 
the request of only the Government or the courts, the Supreme Court 
reviews compliance of laws, legislative decrees, inter-state treaties and 
international covenants with the Constitution and issues the necessary 
verdicts. Supreme Court is authorized to interpret the Constitution, laws 
and legislative decrees.”102 
 In contrast to the proposed model of the Constitutional Drafting 
Commission, Article 121 was very brief and insufficient. However, 
despite being brief, Article 121 separated the subject of judicial review 
from the subject of interpretation. Few changes made to this Article in 
the Constitutional Loya Jirga, with the objective to keep the Article 
precise, proved to be a trigger for the controversy between the three 
branches of the state in the upcoming years. Article 121 of the 
Constitution as approved in Loya Jirga reads as follows: “At the request 
of the Government or courts, the Supreme Court shall review the laws, 
legislative decrees, inter-state treaties as well as international covenants 
for their compliance with the Constitution and their interpretation in 
accordance with the law.”103 
Compromise on the last day of Loya Jirga resulted in the 
introduction of Article 157 and the establishment of the ICOIC.104 
Though it looked like a positive step for ensuring full and timely 
implementation of the Constitution, later incidents proved a 
constitutional crisis was in the making due to the vagueness of Articles 
121 and 157.  
 
 101. Barnett R. Rubin, Crafting a Constitution for Afghanistan, 15 J. OF DEM. 1, 15 (2004).  
 102. Stera Mahkama Afghanistan [Supreme Court of Afghanistan] Qarari Qazai Shomara 5 
Stara Mahkama-Ye Afghanistan Raji ba Adam Motabiqat-I Mawad-I Qanun-I Kamison-I 
Mostaqil-I Nizarat bar Tatbiq-I Qanun Assasi ba Qanun Assasi [Opinion No. 5 on the 
Unconstitutionality of Law of the Independent Commission for Overseeing the Implementation of 
the Constitution], AFGHANISTAN OFFICIAL GAZETTE NO. 986 (2009) (Afg.). 
 103. 2004 CONSTITUTION OF AFGHANISTAN, supra note 12, at art. 121. 
 104. HARESS, supra note 5, at 11.  
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II.  PART TWO: KEY FEATURES AND APPLICABILITY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 
UNDER THE 2004 CONSTITUTION 
Legal systems usually follow either a centralized or decentralized 
model of judicial review. However, judicial review under each legal 
system has its own features. Constitutions, laws, relevant procedures, 
bylaws and precedents highlight these features. The following two sub-
parts discuss the basic features of judicial review in Afghanistan and the 
key judicial review decisions made so far on constitutionality of the 
bills passed by the National Assembly. As discussed earlier, the 
language of the Constitution is very brief on the issue of judicial review 
and interpretation, and the law is not in place to regulate its mechanism. 
To understand the key features, we have to rely heavily on the decisions 
made by the Supreme Court so far.  
A.  Key Features of Judicial Review Under the 2004 Constitution 
The Constitution requires passage of a law to enable the Supreme 
Court in its judicial review and interpretation tasks.105 However, the 
Supreme Court has not submitted a draft law to regulate the subject of 
the judicial review yet. In the absence of such regulating legislation, the 
Supreme Court has thus far acted inconsistently in accepting requests 
and deciding judicial review cases. The following paragraphs elaborate 
some aspects of judicial review based on the practice of the Supreme 
Court in recent years.  
1.  Request Mechanisms  
According to Article 121, the Supreme Court can only receive 
requests for judicial review and interpretation from the government and 
the courts based on law.106 Therefore, the range of institutions that can 
challenge the constitutionality of legislative documents is limited.  
a.  From the Government  
The government, as described by the Constitution, “shall be 
comprised of the Ministers who work under the chairmanship of the 
President.”107 A simple interpretation of this clause is that whenever the 
President, any minister, or heads of any other government agency want 
to trigger Article 121, they must call a meeting of the cabinet. Only after 
the cabinet’s approval can the official ask the Supreme Court for 
 
 105. See 2004 CONSTITUTION OFAFGHANISTAN.  
 106. Id. 
 107. Id. at art. 71.  
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constitutional review or interpretation. In practice, however, the 
government has taken different approaches in asking the Supreme Court 
for judicial review. In many cases, the Office of Administrative Affairs 
of the President has sent official letters, on behalf of the President, to 
the Supreme Court asking for a review of the conformity of certain laws 
with the Constitution.108 In a few cases, the President has held a meeting 
of the cabinet, and after the approval of the cabinet, the Administrative 
Office of the President has sent official letters to the Supreme Court.109 
On only one occasion did the Supreme Court reject requests made by 
the Administrative Office of the President for interpretation of Higher 
Education Law and asked that the request first be approved by the 
cabinet of ministers.110  
While on most occasions, the Administrative Office of the 
President officially asked the Supreme Court to review the conformity 
of laws, on a few other occasions, the cabinet assigned other institutions 
to ask the Supreme Court to make such a request. For instance, in 2016, 
the cabinet assigned the Ministry of Education to work with the 
Afghanistan Independent Administrative Reform and Civil Service 
Commission to increase the number of women in decision-making 
positions. The Ministry of Education submitted its proposal; however, 
the Independent Administrative Reform and Civil Service Commission 
argued the decision contradicted the Labor Law and Civil Service Law, 
which bars the dismissal of current employees without legal 
justification. On November 6, 2016, the President asked the 
Independent Administrative Reforms and Civil Service Commission to 
either work based on Article 44 of the Constitution or ask the Supreme 
Court to interpret the extent to which the cabinet has authority to create 
a developed and balanced society.111  
 On another occasion, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs sent an 
official letter to the Supreme Court and asked for a review of the 
constitutionality of the Law on Diplomatic and Consular Employees.112It 
is not known whether they had the authority of the cabinet or the 
President to make such a request. While the Supreme Court accepted 
 
 108. Letter from Admin. Office of the President to Supreme Court (n.d.) (on file with author).  
 109. Id. 
 110. Letter from Supreme Court to Admin. Office of the President (n.d.) (on file with author). 
 111. The author was given responsibility to follow up implementation of the presidential 
instruction to the relevant agency. 
 112. See generally Stera Mahkama Afghanistan [Supreme Court of Afghanistan] Ruling No. 
20 Regarding Lack of Compliance of Article 5(1) and Article 8 of the Law on Diplomatic and 
Consular Employees with the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, AFGHANISTAN 
OFFICIAL GAZETTE No. 1114 (2013) (Afg.).* 
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the request from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, it rejected a request 
made by an individual minister after his impeachment by Wolsi Jirga.113 
In the famous case of Mujtaba Patang, he asked the Supreme Court to 
clarify whether his dismissal by Wolsi Jirga was a constitutional 
decision.114 The Supreme Court did not accept the request citing lack of 
authority of the impeached minister to forward such a request.115 
Overall, the practice of acceptance of requests by the Supreme Court 
shows inconsistency in dealing with the requests from the government. 
Government agencies have varied in their approaches, and while the 
Supreme Court has objected on a few occasions, it has accepted on 
others.  
b. From the Courts  
Article 121 also allows the courts to make requests for judicial 
review and interpretation.116 However, a clear procedure has never been 
put in place. For many years, it was believed the Supreme Court did not 
receive requests on judicial review or interpretation through the 
courts.117 Interviews with Supreme Court officials and a closer look at 
Supreme Court publications reveal that such requests are made on a 
number of occasions.118  
Until 2013, it was doubtful whether lower courts were able to stop 
court proceedings if they realized there was a need for interpretation of 
the law. The current Law on Organization and Jurisdiction of Judiciary 
prescribes that if during court proceedings, the court determines that 
deciding the case before the court needs interpretation of the law, the 
court stops the proceedings and refer the case to the High Council of the 
Supreme Court.119 This Article is unfortunately unclear on whether the 
primary courts are able to refer the case directly to the Supreme Court 
or they should refer them to the Appellate Court first. Furthermore, it is 
not known whether the question from the lower court can be also about 
compliance of laws with the Constitution or interpretation of the 
Constitution, international treaties and legislative decrees as outlined in 
Article 121 of the Constitution. In addition to lack of a clear procedure 
for the courts to pose judicial review questions to the Supreme Court, a 
 
 113. HARESS, supra note 5, at 23. 
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FINAL_FOR_JCI   5/19/2020  5:45 AM 
2019] Constitutional Interpretation in Afghanistan 241 
lack of capacity in the lower courts on constitutional matters can be the 
other key reason for lack of referral of judicial review questions by the 
lower courts. 
The lower courts have yet to ask the Supreme Court questions as 
part of concrete review. However, they do make their abstract questions 
to the Supreme Court when they need guidance or when they are unsure 
of the meaning of a law or when they believe a particular article of the 
law does not conform to the Constitution. Historically, the Supreme 
Court has received requests for estihda, which literally translates as 
“request for guidance,” from the lower courts and other institutions such 
as ministries. After adoption of the 2004 Constitution, some of these 
requests by the lower courts concerned subjects of Article 121 of the 
Constitution. The Supreme Court organizes regular seminars in which 
the Heads of Appellate Courts and members of the Supreme Court 
participate. After discussing each estihda, members provide written 
answers to those questions. The Supreme Court subsequently publishes 
the responses to the questions in a collection series.  
There are many examples of court requests, a few of which are 
discussed here. For instance, the Provincial Appellate Court of Sar-i-Pul 
wrote to the Supreme Court that Articles 32 and 37 of the Law on 
Criminal Procedures that regulate the search of houses is not in 
conformity with Article 38 of the Constitution.120 The Supreme Court in 
a one-paragraph response explained the differences and concluded that 
there is no contradiction between those two articles and the 
Constitution.121 The same court, in a separate request, wrote that clause 
4 of Article 53 of the Interim Criminal Procedures is not in conformity 
with Article 134 of the Constitution and the word “investigation” should 
be replaced with “detection.”122 The Supreme Court rejected the request 
and argued there is no contradiction.123 These examples demonstrate the 
questions of constitutionality the courts face; however, they do not 
make the questions a part of specific cases. Instead, they continue the 
old way of asking for estihda.  
An interesting aspect of Afghanistan judicial review is whether the 
Constitution of 2004 or practice of courts established the innovative 
approach of letting the courts make requests on “abstract review” from 
 
 120. SUPREME COURT OF ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF AFGHANISTAN, DOCUMENTS AND 
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the Supreme Court. Constitutional review mechanisms around the world 
do not allow requests for abstract review by the courts. Only in Spain, 
does the mechanism have some similarity to practices in Afghanistan. 
Under section 163 of the Spanish Constitution, when hearing a case, if 
an ordinary court considers a government act unconstitutional, it may 
bring the matter to the Constitutional Court for review of its 
constitutionality.124 In those circumstances, if the issue of the law’s 
constitutionality has ‘relevance’ to the case, the Constitutional Court 
may make a decision for nullification of the law and subsequently, the 
referring court may make a decision regarding the case based on the 
ruling of the Constitutional Court.125 In practice, however, the lower 
courts do not wait for the final ruling of the Constitutional Court. 
Therefore, when the ruling of the Constitutional Court is announced, it 
seems like an ‘abstract review' of the question. The practice of estihda is 
very similar to this procedure. While we have not experienced ‘concrete 
review’ cases yet, the practice of ordinary courts and the response of the 
Supreme Court illustrate an ‘abstract review’ in response to requests of 
the courts. The inability of the lower courts to make an appropriate 
analysis of constitutional law questions is a key factor in their 
unwillingness to operationalize concrete review. Instead, those courts 
forward the questions to the Supreme Court, so the Supreme Court 
response helps them with similar cases in the future. This practice of 
forwarding constitutional review matters to the Supreme Court is not an 
ideal mechanism since concrete review is a tool for individuals to 
challenge legislation that contradict their fundamental rights. An 
abstract review request by the ordinary courts takes away this 
opportunity from the individuals.  
The limitation on the number of entities that can request judicial 
review has worked in the government’s favor. This has sparked 
criticism that the Supreme Court is accepting political requests. The 
political question doctrine is based on the notion that courts should 
abstain from deciding those constitutional matters that fall under the 
jurisdiction of political branches of the state.126 The Supreme Court has 
not rejected any case for its non-justiciability so far, though there are 
opinions that the case of Mujtaba Patang was not justiciable.127 While 
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the Supreme Court accepted and decided the impeachment case of 
Minister Spanta, perhaps a political matter,128 it did not give a response 
to the government when Wolesi Jirga impeached seven ministers in 
2016, presumably for political reasons. The Supreme Court’s lack of 
response can possibly indicate that it considers the case to be non-
justiciable, though influence from the executive branch on the Supreme 
Court to avoid issuing an unfavorable decision cannot be overruled. It is 
necessary for the Supreme Court to clearly spell out its stance on 
political matters. A clear stance by the Supreme Court sets the 
precedent and prevents referral of political question in the future.  
Under the American model of judicial review, courts are barred 
from hearing political claims.129 In Baker v. Carr, the Supreme Court of 
the United States defined political question and ruled that the courts 
cannot decide those cases.130 The relevant part of the decision reads: 
Prominent on the surface of any case held to involve a political 
question is found a textually demonstrable constitutional 
commitment of the issue to a coordinate political department; 
or a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards 
for resolving it; or the impossibility of deciding without an 
initial policy determination of a kind clearly for non-judicial 
discretion; or the impossibility of a court’s undertaking 
independent resolution without expressing lack of the respect 
due coordinate branches of government; or an unusual need for 
unquestioning adherence to a political decision already made; 
or the potentiality of embarrassment from multifarious 
pronouncements by various departments on one question.131 
In contrast to the American model of judicial review, adjudicating 
political matters is not a strange practice under the European model.132 
Hans Kelsen, the founder of the theory, acknowledges the role of the 
political decisions in such structures.133 According to Kelsen, since 
courts do not enter the political arena, it is up to a political organization 
to make such decisions.134 There are also examples of High Courts that 
hear cases of a political nature, but those courts possess clear 
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constitutional authority.135 For example, the High Court of the Greek 
Cypriot State has jurisdiction to hear cases in connection with conflicts, 
contests of power, or competence arising between the House of 
Representatives and any other organ of the state.136 These are of course 
political questions; however, the articles of the Constitution of Cyprus 
are elaborate and one cannot contest the legitimacy of the power of the 
High Court which has the final decision making authority in regard to 
decisions coming from the inferior courts.137 Meanwhile, the 2004 
Afghan Constitution mandates that any dispute arising between parties, 
including the state, should be submitted to the courts for adjudication.138 
Does that mean political questions can be filed in the Supreme Court? 
It makes sense that a majority of judicial review requests have 
come from the government considering that the Afghan government and 
courts have the exclusive right to make such requests. Moreover, it is 
also logical that individual citizens do not make requests for judicial 
review directly to the Supreme Court considering that they are not 
specifically conferred that right under Article 121 of the Constitution. 
One assumption is that if individual litigants realize that the legislation 
that concerns their disputes is potentially unconstitutional, they will ask 
the ordinary court to request the Supreme Court to engage in judicial 
review. Ideally and as the law vaguely requires, the ordinary court 
should stop the proceedings, send the question up to the Supreme Court 
to ensure conformity of the legislation with the Constitution, and 
resume the case once the Supreme Court issues a verdict. This has not 
happened yet.139 Instead, ordinary courts send their abstract questions to 
the Supreme Court.140 This may be because they are unfamiliar with the 
system and ordinary courts are not ready to hear such cases: it was as if 
such requests by the citizens never existed. Difficulty to file cases of 
judicial review to the Supreme Court through lower courts might justify 
why the majority of Supreme Court decisions favor the government.  
To summarize, the requests by the Government are under ‘abstract 
review,’ while the requests by courts are supposed to be done under 
‘concrete review.’ Nevertheless, the courts have filed their requests 
under the ‘abstract review’ mechanism and have not considered the 
constitutionality of the matters as part of an ongoing dispute. ‘Concrete 
review’ is yet to be practiced in Afghanistan.  
 
 135. Miscellaneous Provisions of 1964, Admin. of Justice Pub. L. No. 33-04 (Cyprus). 
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2.  Time It Takes to Issue a Verdict  
In the absence of the required legislation, the Supreme Court has 
not established any timeline for discussions and timelines for issuing a 
verdict.141 The timeline for each case varies and has ranged from 
thirteen days to many months. When the Court reviewed the 
constitutionality of the ICOIC Law and Media Law, it took almost 
seven and a half months.142 The judicial review of the Law on 
Diplomatic and Consular Employees took thirteen days.143 Lack of a 
clear timeline has branded Supreme Court judicial review as an 
unpredictable process.  
3.  Bench that Decides 
The nine members of the Supreme Court are divided into five 
divisions or diwans. If parties to the case challenge a decision of an 
appellate court, or legislation requires a mandatory decision in the 
Supreme Court, each diwan has the authority to make a decision based 
on their subject-matter jurisdiction. On the contrary, the High Council 
of the Supreme Court, which consists of all nine justices, must review 
requests made under Article 121 of the Constitution.144 The Council 
meetings are held every fifteen days, or as deemed necessary.145 In 
ordinary cases, it is possible for a bench member to attach his dissent; 
however, no member of the Supreme Court has published a dissent on 
judicial review or interpretation issues.  
Constitutional issues are intricate and therefore a consensus of the 
bench members is not always expected. Dissent is a normal practice. 
Individual Supreme Court members can see lack of dissent in judicial 
review decisions as a sign of lack of independence. In addition, it raises 
the question whether the members are afraid of being politically 
questioned for their opinions.  
4.  Procedures  
The Supreme Court has not issued any procedures for deciding 
judicial review issues.146 When a request reaches the Supreme Court, it 
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goes to the Directorate General of Scrutiny and Perusal.147 The General 
Directorate of Scrutiny and Perusal, which acts as the research body of 
the Supreme Court, primarily performs a review of the subjects in 
question and then shares the arguments with a proposed text of verdict 
to the High Council meeting for final decision-making.148 However, in 
the absence of established and elaborated procedures, there is little 
known about how the issues are discussed and how the Supreme Court 
High Council comes to a conclusion on a given subject.  
Constitutional matters possess sophisticated aspects, and every 
decision made by the decision making body should be well reasoned 
and justified.149 The standard of reasoning in judicial review cases 
decided by the Supreme Court differs from one case to the other.150 
While the Supreme Court conducts robust analysis in some cases, its 
reasoning in other cases is less substantial. For instance, when the 
Supreme Court reviewed the constitutionality of the ICOIC Law, it 
considered the ICOIC as part of the executive branch,151 while the 
Constitution clearly recognizes the independence of the ICOIC.152 In 
addition, the Supreme Court erred in mixing review of constitutionality 
with review of laws and giving feedback for improvement of legislation 
when it reviewed the ICOIC Law.  
Some Supreme Court judicial review decisions also show that 
whenever a question is raised even on one article, the Supreme Court 
entitles itself to review the constitutionality of the entire law. This has 
been evident in review of ICOIC Law. Though the government's 
questions were about Article 8, which concerns the interpretation of the 
Constitution, the Supreme Court did not stop there and went on to 
review constitutionality of other articles that had not been asked by the 
government.  
The Supreme Court has followed the trend of inconsistency even 
in the title of its judicial review decisions. The Court used different 
phrases bearing different legal meanings in its decisions. Ghizaal Haress 
puts this inconsistency in the following language: “The four opinions 
presented are under different titles: two of them are called Qaraar 
Qazayee (judicial verdict), Musaweba Shura-i-Aali (the decision of the 
High Council), and Hukm-e-Qazayee (judicial ruling).”153 
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In the absence of a law, an internal procedure that unifies the steps, 
procedures, timelines and terms could be very helpful in bringing some 
level of consistency to judicial review in Afghanistan. 
5.  Type of Review  
Constitutional review is conducted either before (priori) or after 
(posteriori) legislation comes into force.154 In Afghanistan, judicial 
review has been done on a posteriori basis. This principle is unwritten; 
however, Article 121 of the Constitution mentions the word “law” and, 
as defined by the Constitution, “[l]aw shall be what both houses of the 
National Assembly approve and the President endorses, unless this 
Constitution states otherwise.”155 While it is assumed that the review 
takes place on a posteriori basis, a posteriori review of international 
treaties is not practical. Given the existence of the issue, the new draft 
Law on Jurisdiction and Organization of the Judiciary, which is debated 
in the National Assembly, requires a posteriori review of laws and 
legislative decrees, and a priori review of international treaties before 
Afghanistan can accept those treaties.156 The Supreme Court has yet to 
receive a request for reviewing the constitutionality of an international 
treaty.  
In most cases, after rejecting the legislation by the President, Wolsi 
Jirga passes those laws without any changes by two-thirds majority in 
which case, those laws are considered as approved without endorsement 
of the President.157 In 2018, the government established a committee to 
scrutinize the laws passed by the National Assembly before they are 
submitted to the President. If the committee realizes there are 
constitutionality issues, like in the case of the Law on Issuance of 
Legislative Decrees, it recommends submission of the law to the 
Supreme Court to ensure its constitutionality.158 Only in the case of Law 
on Diplomatic and Consular Employees, after the President signed the 
law, did the Ministry of Foreign Affairs raise concerns and ask the 
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Supreme Court to review the constitutionality of that law.159 To 
summarize, the law or the legislative decree should be in force before 
the government or the courts can ask for a review. From the 
constitutional point of view, priori review is not possible.  
In contrast to what is said about the requirement of priori review,160 
the Supreme Court has provided opinions on draft laws.161 The Supreme 
Court has previously provided opinions on the constitutionality of the 
draft Labor Code, draft Law on Sale of Land, draft Law of Academy of 
Sciences, draft Law of Military Courts, draft Law of Civil Servants, 
draft Law of Salary of Senior Officials, draft Law of ICOIC, and draft 
Law of Media.162 The Supreme Court has also provided its opinion on 
the draft Family Law in response to a request from the Ministry of 
Justice.163 This again shows lack of consistency. While the Supreme 
Court is strict in handling some cases, it has been willing to accept other 
cases even if the practice does not have any basis in the Constitution or 
the laws.  
Meanwhile, an official letter from the Administrative Office of the 
President to ICOIC shows that President Karzai had asked his 
Administrative Office to share draft laws after cabinet approval, and 
before sharing with the National Assembly, for review of ICOIC.164 This 
could have been a type of priori review. However, this step has been 
discontinued and is not part of legislative processes anymore.  
6.  Publishing the Decisions  
The Supreme Court does not publish its decisions on constitutional 
matters immediately after decisions are made. The public gets 
information on the decision from the parties involved through local 
media. Months after the decisions are issued, the Ministry of Justice 
publishes the concerned laws along with the verdict of the Supreme 
Court in the Official Gazette.165 Departing from custom, the Ministry of 
Justice published the Supreme Court verdict on the Law on Diplomatic 
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and Consular Employees separately in the Official Gazette.166 This was 
because the law had been published, and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
challenged the constitutionality of the law after its enforcement.167 
Judicial review decisions and interpretation are highly important to 
citizens and government entities alike. Lack of publishing or late 
publishing only tarnishes the importance of this critical process. 
Understanding the importance of these cases, the High Council of Rule 
of Law and Anti-Corruption has requested that the Supreme Court 
publish those decisions.168 In addition, based on the recently approved 
draft Law on Jurisdiction and Organization of the Judiciary, the 
Supreme Court is obliged to publish judicial review and constitutional 
interpretation decisions in the Official Gazette and other media 
outlets.169  
The published decisions contain the arguments and conclusions of 
the Supreme Court. The Ministry of Justice publishes the Supreme 
Court decision in full length in Farsi and Pashto, the two official 
languages of the country.170 However, the Ministry of Justice removes 
the articles that are deemed unconstitutional by the Supreme Court from 
the main body of the law and keeps the places of the removed articles 
blank.171 Furthermore, the Ministry of Justice adds a footnote on the 
same page and clarifies that the article or clause is removed as a result 
of the Supreme Court decision. Action of the Ministry of Justice is 
procedural and is meant to put an effect on the decision of the Supreme 
Court.  
There are also reports of unpublished decisions. For instance, after 
an initial rejection by the President, Wolsi Jirga passed the Law on 
Salary, Expenditures and Privileges of State High Officials by a two-
thirds majority in 2009. The President then asked the Supreme Court to 
review the constitutionality of this law. While the Supreme Court 
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announced the law as unconstitutional,172 the Ministry of Justice never 
published it. 
As mentioned in previous sections, the Supreme Court has a 
number of publications, including a yearbook and magazines that 
contain the collection of estihda of the lower courts. In these 
publications, there are also cases of request for guidance on 
constitutional matters and responses of the Supreme Court.  
7.  Enforceability of Supreme Court Decisions  
The text of Article 121 of the Constitution does not clarify whether 
judicial review and interpretive decisions made by the Supreme Court 
are merely advisory, or rather final and thus must be enforced.173 
However, the practice and the wording of Supreme Court verdicts give 
the impression that they are final, enforceable, and not appealable. In 
one of the requests for interpretation of the Law on Pension, the 
Supreme Court ruled that there is no difference between a court decision 
and a Supreme Court decision interpreting a law.174 The Supreme Court 
continued by stating that executing interpretive decisions is the 
responsibility of the Executive branch.175 This language and 
implementation of the decisions by state organs proves the decisions are 
final, though there has been some resistance by Wolsi Jirga following 
the Spanta case.176 This is not an unfamiliar incident; after Marbury v. 
Madison, although President Jefferson was not happy with the decision 
and initially objected, believing John Marshall used the opportunity to 
expand the authority of the judiciary, he eventually bowed to the 
decision.177 
After the Supreme Court concludes a judicial review case, the 
Ministry of Justice publishes the law in the Official Gazette. However, 
there is no immediate subsequent action by either the National 
Assembly or the executive branch to fill the gap created by the removal 
of selected articles.178 The impact of this gap was felt when the Supreme 
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Court declared certain articles of ICOIC Law unconstitutional.179 One of 
the articles was about the process of dismissing members.180 ICOIC did 
not propose new articles, nor did the National Assembly take action to 
add new articles. In 2017, when the majority of ICOIC members voted 
to oust the Chairperson of ICOIC, the challenge surfaced. On one hand, 
the majority members of the ICOIC had made a decision to remove the 
Chairperson. On the other hand, the replacement legislation was not in 
place. An ICOIC member argued that by removing the text of articles 
from the law, the Supreme Court departed from its original role in the 
Constitution and was actually making law.181 Though this criticism is 
valid, it is obvious that the Supreme Court is not the party to be blamed. 
It was the job of the ICOIC, the executive branch or National Assembly 
to propose new articles to fill in the gap before it became too late.  
There are also cases in which the Supreme Court, after providing 
an opinion on a matter, suggested that an amendment be made to the 
law. For example, after reviewing Article 39 of the Law on Elimination 
of Violence against Women, the Supreme Court announced the Article 
is inapplicable to crimes against women that do not originate from 
family relationships.182 The Supreme Court also explained in its opinion 
that it had proposed an amendment to the law and shared it with the 
Ministry of Justice for further consideration.183 While the Supreme 
Court can request the government and the National Assembly to replace 
legislation, it is also the responsibility of the government and the 
National Assembly to take responsibility and to fill in the gaps quickly 
before a controversy erupts. Again, regulating legislation can prevent 
similar controversies.  
8.  The Impact on Individuals’ Human Rights  
The limitation on the entities that can request judicial review and 
interpretation of legislative documents has resulted in the growing 
irrelevance of judicial review as a tool for protecting the fundamental 
rights of individuals. In most countries, judicial review is a key 
instrument in striking down the legislation or government acts that are 
not upholding the constitutional rights of the citizens.184 Ambiguity in 
Article 121 of the Constitution strips individuals of this important 
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opportunity.185 Additionally, institutions such as the National Assembly 
or Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission also lack this 
right.186 Under these circumstances, judicial review decisions have thus 
far had a minimal impact on the rights of citizens.  
There is also legislation that seems to violate the terms of the 
Constitution; however, there is no interest on the part of the government 
or the courts to ask the Supreme Court to review the constitutionality of 
such legislation. The Law of National Reconciliation, Public Amnesty 
and National Stability, passed in 2007 by the National Assembly, is a 
bold example.187 This Law extended a pardon to criminal acts 
committed by individuals during the years of war in Afghanistan.188 Had 
the individuals had the opportunity to request for judicial review, there 
could have been requests made by individuals on the constitutionality of 
that law.189  
Despite those limitations, in at least one example, civil society 
organizations asked the Supreme Court to decriminalize the ‘escape 
from home’ phenomenon, which results from violence against a 
woman.190 The Supreme Court accepted the request and agreed with the 
interpretation of the civil society organizations.191 However, in its 
response, the Supreme Court failed to mention a single article of the 
Constitution or the ordinary laws.192 Is this an indication that the 
Supreme Court is willing to hear requests by individuals, and if so, is it 
constitutional to accept such requests directly? Or this is another 
example of inconsistency? 
As explained above and illustrated by numerous examples, 
inconsistency is a common feature in nearly all judicial review 
decisions so far. Lack of clear procedures has resulted in varying 
decisions. To examine this further, Part B explains the most important 
cases of judicial review decided by the Supreme Court to date.  
B.  Landmark Judicial Review Cases Under the 2004 Constitution 
Reviewing the key judicial review decisions will provide a better 
understanding of the challenges and the flaws of the process. This 
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article gives a detailed analysis of one the predominant cases of judicial 
review and provides a brief analysis of other relevant cases of judicial 
review. The Ministry of Justice and the Supreme Court have published 
only a few judicial review decisions. Therefore, this list is not 
comprehensive.  
1.  Judicial Review of ICOIC Law 
Establishment of the ICOIC was foreseen in Article 157 of the 
Constitution; however, the authorities of this entity are not outlined.193 
The Constitution only articulates the appointment mechanism of ICOIC 
members and requires parliamentary legislation for defining ICOIC 
authorities.194 In a move to challenge the decision of the Supreme Court 
in Spanta,195 Wolsi Jirga added a clause in the ICOIC Law that 
authorized the ICOIC to interpret the Constitution.196 Mishrano Jirga 
also approved the law; however, the President did not sign the law and 
sent it back to Wolsi Jirga, citing unconstitutionality of several 
articles.197 Furious about the President’s position on the subject, Wolsi 
Jirga approved the law with the two-thirds majority required for 
bypassing the signature of the President.198 Given the decision of the 
Supreme Court in Spanta, it was expected that the President would ask 
the Supreme Court to review the law’s constitutionality.   
In the Spanta case, President Karzai triggered Article 121 of the 
Constitution, requesting interpretation of the Constitution. However, the 
ICOIC Law was the first law to undergo judicial review. As a result, the 
Supreme Court announced a number of the ICOIC Law articles 
unconstitutional.199 Given the importance of the Spanta case to the 
future of judicial review, it is important to review how the Supreme 
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Court analyzed the facts of the case and how the decision was 
ultimately reached.  
In its decision, the Supreme Court provided several justifications 
in support of maintaining its authority to interpret the Constitution.200 
Below is a summary of the Supreme Court’s reasoning extracted from 
the original decision: 
(i)  The Supreme Court stated that based on the archives of the 
Constitution Drafting Commission, Article 121 did not exist in 
the initial drafts of the Constitution. Before September 10, 
2003, the draft included a separate chapter regarding a 
Constitutional Court, which was assigned the authority to (1) 
review the conformity of laws, legislative decrees, 
international agreements, and Constitutional covenants, and (2) 
interpret the Constitution, laws and legislative decrees.  
(ii)  The Supreme Court adds that after September 2003, the 
chapter on Constitutional Court was removed for unknown 
reasons. Instead, the authorities, which had been given to the 
Constitutional Court, were assigned to the Supreme Court 
under Article 121. The language used in the draft Constitution 
that was distributed to the Constitutional Loya Jirga read as 
follows: “At the request of only the government and courts, the 
Supreme Court shall review conformity of laws, legislative 
decrees, inter-state treaties and international covenants with the 
Constitution and issue the required verdict. Supreme Court is 
authorized to interpret the Constitution, laws and legislative 
decrees.” The Supreme Court argues that the Constitutional 
Loya Jirga merely combined the two sentences to make the 
sentence more precise. In addition, the Supreme Court argues 
that the Constitution, the laws, legislative decrees, inter-state 
treaties and international conventions need interpretation. 
Therefore, merging the two sentences and using the word 
“their” made it possible for the Supreme Court to interpret the 
international treaties and covenants as well. The Supreme 
Court concluded that the best word that could be used was the 
word “their” since it covers the interpretation of the 
constitution, the laws, legislative documents, inter-state treaties 
and international covenants.  
(iii)  The Supreme Court also addresses Article157, which 
outlines the mechanism to establish the ICOIC. The Court 
mentions that this Article was not part of the draft Constitution 
and was added by Constitutional Loya Jirga on its last day. 
Even after the addition of Article 157, no further change was 
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made to Article 121. Adding an article regarding ICOIC 
without giving the authority of Constitutional interpretation to 
ICOIC implies that the authority to interpret the Constitution 
remains with the Supreme Court.  
(iv)  The Supreme Court asserts that interpreting the 
Constitution, legislative decrees and laws requires a mandatory 
judicial verdict, which can only be issued by a court. 
(v)  Finally, the Supreme Court argued that the very name of 
the ICOIC suggests that the job of the commission should be 
limited to overseeing the implementation of the Constitution, 
rather than interpreting it. If the ICOIC has the authority of 
interpretation, the Constitution is effectively amended, which 
is only allowed through Loya Jirga.201 
The Supreme Court explains the history of how Article 121 was 
drafted and the intentions behind it.202 Having the history in mind, it is 
difficult to argue the ICOIC should have the authority to interpret the 
Constitution. While the Supreme Court interprets the laws, legislative 
decrees, inter-state treaties and international conventions, it also reviews 
their conformity with the Constitution. As Sarwar Danish, a former 
member of the Constitution Drafting Commission argues, no other 
country has a system that assigns the authority of judicial review to one 
institution, while leaving the interpretation of the Constitution in the 
hands of another institution.203 
The argument made by the Supreme Court on the role of ICOIC on 
Constitutional oversight is also worth considering. Having vague 
language on interpretation of the Constitution does not mean this task 
should be given to an organization that was merely established to 
oversee the implementation of the Constitution. As the name of ICOIC 
suggests, this institution was established to oversee the implementation 
of the Constitution. Neither in Loya Jirga discussions, nor in the 
Constitution itself is there an indication that Loya Jirga intended to 
assign interpretation of the Constitution to ICOIC.204 Regardless, ICOIC 
was of the view that since Article 121 does not have an explicit 
language on assigning the authority of interpretation of the Constitution 
to the Supreme Court,205 it is up to the National Assembly to decide 
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which organization has this authority.206 This argument looks 
compelling; however, the drafting history of Article 121, coupled with 
the Supreme Court’s authority to interpret laws, legislative decrees and 
inter-state treaties makes it illogical to have a separate institution 
interpret the Constitution. Many commentators who wrote on 
Afghanistan’s Constitution also agree with this argument.207  
The Supreme Court did not stop after declaring Article 8 
unconstitutional; it went ahead with nullifying other articles of ICOIC 
Law.208 One such example is the article that established a mechanism for 
removal of a member through a proposal209 made by at least five 
members and approved by the majority of Wolsi Jirga.210 The Supreme 
Court found this provision unconstitutional for the following reasons: 
(1) ICOIC is not a commercial company in which its members decide 
on the removal of other members; (2) Wolsi Jirga is not the executive 
branch to remove members of a committee that is part of the executive 
branch; (3) though appointment of ministers, Attorney General, Director 
of National Security, President of the Central Bank and the Director of 
Red Crescent is confirmed by Wolsi Jirga, the President is charged with 
handling their dismissal or acceptance of resignation and; (4) the 
proposal to remove a member of ICOIC by the other members would 
seriously undermine the independence of the organization and would 
create fear that ICOIC is influenced by Wolsi Jirga.211 The Supreme 
Court’s argument regarding the possible political influence of the Wolsi 
Jirga, as the authority, which was supposed to impeach members of 
ICOIC, is understandable and justified, a point that is also emphasized 
by leading constitutional law scholars.212 However, comparing the 
ICOIC to a corporation does not make sense. The Constitution uses a 
similar procedure requiring vote of the relevant house of the National 
Assembly to hand-over a member to the prosecution office for 
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committing a crime.213 In a large number of countries with entities 
similar to the ICOIC, it is up to the members to remove each other. 214 
The bodies charged with constitutional review in Belgium, the Czech 
Republic, Germany, France, Hungary, Italy, Poland, and Spain, among 
others, exercise a similar removal procedure.215  
The Supreme Court also found it unconstitutional for the ICOIC to 
review existing laws, identify unconstitutional articles and submit them 
to the President and the National Assembly for correction. In the eyes of 
the Supreme Court this was also unconstitutional because Article 121 of 
the Constitution not only authorizes the Supreme Court to interpret the 
Constitution, laws, legislative decrees, inter-state treaties and 
international covenants, but also gives the sole authority to review the 
constitutionality of the aforementioned legislative instruments to the 
Supreme Court.216 The argument of the Supreme Court is not 
compelling. It is obvious that constitutional review is a completely 
different mechanism than reviewing laws with the objective of 
providing recommendations to improve them.217 Any branch can 
exercise the latter and it does not trespass on the authority of the 
Supreme Court.  
Restricting ICOIC membership to only those with Afghan 
nationality and the immunity of ICOIC members from arrest without 
agreement of the President were the two other points declared 
unconstitutional and thus unenforceable by the Supreme Court.218 
Countries around the world have different approaches on these two 
subjects.219 The Supreme Court introduced a concept based on which 
ordinary laws cannot extend the number, authorities or conditions listed 
in the Constitution. This concept might be difficult to defend in the 
future because ordinary laws usually expand upon the topics that have a 
brief mention in the Constitution.  
The judicial review of ICOIC law is by far the most detailed 
decision of the Supreme Court yet.220 This outcome was expected as the 
ICOIC law passed by the National Assembly had the intention to restrict 
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the role of the Supreme Court.221 The Supreme Court, by providing a 
deep analysis of the subject matters, wanted to put an end to the 
questions and prove itself as the final authority on Constitutional 
interpretation. Despite the Supreme Court’s attempt, the controversy 
around constitutional review persists.  
Other cases of judicial review are listed briefly here: 
2.  Law on Mass Media 
In 2009, in response to a government request, the Supreme Court 
announced that paragraph 2 of Article 13 of the Mass Media Law, 
which required Wolesi Jirga approval for appointment of Director of 
National TV and Radio, was unconstitutional.222 The Supreme Court 
argued that the Constitution enlists the officials whose appointments 
need Wolesi Jirga’s approval and that the Director of National TV and 
Radio is not among them.223 
3. Decision on Law of Diplomatic and Consular Employees  
The National Assembly restricted diplomatic employment only to 
those individuals who are nationals of Afghanistan exclusively.224 At the 
request of the government, the Supreme Court rejected the limitations, 
arguing that the Afghan nationality requirement is limited to holding the 
office of the Presidency, Vice Presidency and would conditionally apply 
to ministers but not anyone else.225  
4.  Law on Legislative Decrees 
In 2018, the Supreme Court declared the Law on Legislative 
Decrees unconstitutional.226 The Supreme Court concluded that adopting 
a law on legislative decrees is an infringement on the work of the 
Executive Branch.227 
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5.  Other Less Publicized Cases 
In addition to the above cases, the Supreme Court has also 
reviewed other laws which are listed here:  
(i)  Law on Salaries, Expenditures and Privileges of State 
Senior Officials: In 2009, the government asked the Supreme 
Court to review the constitutionality of the Law on Salaries, 
Expenditures and Privileges of State Senior Officials. This 
decision was never announced, nor was it published.228  
(ii)  Law for Secured Transactions on Immovable Property in 
Banking Transactions 
(iii)  Law on Property Dealers: After review, the Law of 
Property Dealers, the cabinet instructed Ministry of Justice to 
ask the Supreme Court to review the constitutionality of clause 
1, Article 34 and Article 35 of the Law.229  
(iv)  Labor Law 
(v)  Law on Sale of Land 
(vi)  Law of Academy of Sciences 
(vii)  Law of Civil Servants 
(viii)  Law of Military Courts230 
C. Flaws and Gaps in Judicial Review Process of Afghanistan 
Initially, it was not expected that Article 121 of the Constitution 
would be difficult to implement.231 However, the vague language of 
Article 121 and the lack of regulating legislation made judicial review 
inconsistent and sometimes controversial. The following paragraphs 
explain the main flaws of judicial review that surfaced after 
enforcement of the 2004 Constitution. 
1.  Judicial Review Undermined by Constitutional Interpretation 
Judicial review is a new phenomenon in the constitutional culture 
of Afghanistan. However, the concept of constitutional interpretation 
has attracted more attention. Most politicians and Afghan citizens do 
not make a clear distinction between the two concepts and many see 
Article 121 of the Constitution as an “interpretation clause” rather than 
a “judicial review clause.”232 As such, judicial review is underdeveloped 
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and has been practiced inconsistently.233 Unfortunately, judges do not 
have a clear understanding of how judicial review works and they are 
not trained either.234 The review of the questions raised by judges, as 
estihda, illustrate that the judges just post a question to the Supreme 
Court rather than trying to contextualize their questions as a concrete 
dispute that has come before the court. A training program for judges 
and other actors involved in this area is required to clarify the 
distinctions and draw attention to the role of judicial review in 
protecting individual rights and constitutional values.235  
2.  Limitation on Accessibility 
Article 121 of the Constitution only empowers the government and 
the courts to ask the Supreme Court for judicial review.236 Compared to 
the courts, the executive branch has used this mechanism excessively.237 
The courts have only raised questions regarding the meaning of some 
terms in the laws, or have merely pointed to an article of the law that 
they considered unconstitutional.238 There is no record if individual 
litigants challenge the constitutionality of any law, legislative document 
or international treaty in the courts.239 Even if individual litigants have 
challenged the constitutionality of a law, their requests may have been 
ignored or unheard since there is no outlined procedure for this 
purpose.240 In the absence of any law or other legislative documents, 
whether an individual litigant is able to file a case on the 
constitutionality of laws or legislative documents directly in ordinary 
courts remains unanswered.241 However, in a rather surprising 
instruction, the High Council of Supreme Court in January 2008 asked 
the primary courts not to share their requests for guidance, estihda, 
directly to the Supreme Court; and instead, they should try to find an 
answer with the help of the provincial appellate court.242 The High 
Council clarified the primary courts are working under supervision of 
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the appellate courts and thus the primary courts are not authorized to 
ask for estihda to the Supreme Court directly.243 
There is a possibility that the drafters of the 2004 Constitution 
thought that whenever an individual litigant challenges the 
constitutionality of an act, the case should be stopped and the lower 
court would request the Supreme Court for review. In contrast, and as 
described earlier, ordinary courts usually ask the Supreme Court for 
guidance (estihda) when they face challenging questions; however, 
these questions are general in nature and not in the context of specific 
disputes before the court.244  
Under either of these interpretations, the right to question 
constitutionality in Afghanistan is very limited. Unlike some countries 
where the speakers and/or members of parliament, can ask for 
constitutional review of legislative or executive acts,245 Afghanistan has 
adopted a conservative approach for the use of judicial review resulting 
in decisions being struck down that do not favor government interests.246 
This is somewhat comparable to the Constitutional Council of France 
between 1958 and 1970.247 Charles de Gaulle is quoted as saying the 
Constitutional Council is a “cannon directed against the Parliament" to 
protect the interests of the executive against the legislature.248 Nearly all 
cases decided by the Constitutional Council of France during that period 
were in favor of the executive branch.249 France addressed this drawback 
by extending access to the Constitutional Council to a range of clients, 
including individuals, as part of the 2008 constitutional amendments.250 
In many countries, individuals have the opportunity to request 
judicial review of laws or government acts.251 In Afghanistan, 
individuals might theoretically be able to raise questions about the 
unconstitutionality of legislative documents before the court during the 
course of litigation; however, it is completely up to the court whether to 
ask the Supreme Court for judicial review or simply ignore such 
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requests.252 Therefore, judicial review has not been an effective 
instrument to uphold citizens’ fundamental rights.253Rather it is used to 
uphold the interests of the executive in particular.254  
3.  Compliance with Sharia 
Prohibition of laws that contradict Sharia is a debated subject 
matter in Afghanistan. The 2004 Constitution states that no law shall be 
against the tenants of Islam.255 The Supreme Court, based on Article 
121, is the guardian of the Constitution; however, the Constitution is not 
clear which entity ensures that contradiction between laws and Sharia 
does not occur.256  
One assumption is that the Supreme Court should also examine 
laws’ compliance with Sharia if asked by the courts or the 
government.257 In fact, the existence of Dar-ul-efta or Center of Fatwa, 
as part of the Supreme Court could be evidence of the Supreme Court’s 
willingness to conduct judicial review and interpretation under the lens 
of Sharia. Moreover, in one case where the government asked the 
Supreme Court to interpret Article 7 of the Constitution, the Supreme 
Court relied heavily on Article 3 in its analysis.258 Article 7 obligates the 
Government to observe and implement the international treaties that 
Afghanistan has joined,259 while Article 3, the repugnancy clause, 
prohibits laws that are against the principles of Sharia.260 The Supreme 
Court argued that if any international treaty that Afghanistan has 
acceded to contradicts Article 3 of the Constitution, the government, 
considering Article 3 and international law principles, has the right to 
proceed with withdrawing Afghanistan from those treaties.261 
On the other hand, there is a notion that rejects the authority of 
Supreme Court to review compliance of legislation with the 
Constitution and emphasizes the lack of clarity on this matter.262 There 
have not been any judicial review cases referred to the Supreme Court 
on this ground, though there have been a number of occasions where 
ordinary courts have stopped applying the laws because they consider 
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the laws contrary to Sharia.263 One example is hesitation of courts on 
decisions related to interest or riba (usurious interest rates or predatory 
interest practices in financial transactions) in commercial transactions 
because Sharia prohibits riba as haram. The law does not allow courts 
to stop using legislative documents if they believe they contradict 
Sharia.264 Instead of ignoring the laws, the courts should have the 
opportunity to ask the Supreme Court to decide whether the law 
conforms with the Constitution or not. 
4.  Lack of Enabling Legislation  
To regulate judicial review and interpretation, the Constitution 
requires a law to be passed by the National Assembly.265 Fourteen years 
after the Constitution’s adoption, the law required in Article 121 is not 
in place.266 The primary piece of legislation related to the work of the 
judiciary is the Law on Organization and Jurisdiction of the Judiciary; 
however, it only has one article regarding interpretation and judicial 
review.267 As mentioned earlier, a new Law on Organization and 
Jurisdiction of Judiciary is currently debated in the National Assembly, 
which has more guidance on judicial review and interpretation; 
however, it does not provide detailed procedures.268  
Typically, a proposed law should outline the process to file a case 
and specify the timelines, explain the procedures, clarify how to raise 
questions of constitutionality in the courts, and mandate passage of 
regulations and internal procedures for the Supreme Court to decide 
cases of judicial review and constitutional interpretation.  
5.  Judicial Review of Regulations  
Judicial review of regulations and government acts is a critical part 
of legal systems. Different approaches, such as using ordinary courts, 
administrative courts or administrative bodies, are applied to strike 
down regulations, policies or government acts that contradict laws 
approved by the legislature.269 The 2004 Constitution authorizes the 
government to pass regulations and requires the regulations to conform 
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with the spirit and body of laws.270 However, it does not specify which 
entity ensures compliance.271 In the winter of 2018, the Administrative 
Procedures Law required that such questions be asked to the public 
rights courts, though there is no evidence that shows such requests are 
made to the ordinary courts. Currently, the only entity that can abolish 
or amend the regulations is the Cabinet, which is also the authority that 
approves regulations. There are examples, however, that the Supreme 
Court has provided comments on regulation-type documents at the 
request of the executive branch institutions. In 2008, Independent 
Directorate of Local Governance requested the Supreme Court to 
review the Bylaw on Terms of References and Authorities of the  
Governors and provide their opinions.272 An expert team assigned by the 
Supreme Court reviewed the Bylaw against the Constitution and the 
Law of Local Governance and found it compatible.273 Subsequently, the 
High Council of the Supreme Court agreed with the analysis.274 Does 
this mean the Supreme Court entitles itself to review regulations and 
other legislative instruments approved by the executive branch for their 
compliance with the law? While there are some examples of this 
intention, we do not have a precise answer from the Supreme Court yet.  
6.  Judicial Review of International Treaties 
Article 121 of the Constitution authorizes the Supreme Court to 
review the constitutionality of inter-state treaties and international 
covenants.275 As pointed out in earlier parts of this article, judicial 
review in Afghanistan is conducted on a posteriori basis. However, it 
does not make sense to have an already enforced international treaty go 
through the judicial review process at the domestic level. The most 
appropriate time to conduct a constitutional review is when the treaty is 
under discussion or signed by the government, before the government 
submits it to the National Assembly for ratification, similar to the 
method employed in France.276 The recent draft Law on Jurisdiction and 
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Organization of the Judiciary has recognized priori review of 
international treaties.277  
Until today, there has never been a case of review of treaties by the 
Supreme Court.278 Therefore, many aspects of judicial review of 
international treaties are still vague and unclear.279 The ICOIC has 
received requests on the interpretation of Article 7 of the Constitution 
(which is about Afghanistan’s adherence to international treaties) and 
has provided its legal advice.280 The only example that applies to 
judicial review of an international treaty is a request by the Afghanistan 
Independent Human Rights Commission to the ICOIC to give its 
opinion on the constitutionality of administrative detention centers that 
kept war prisoners in the custody of foreign forces for extended periods 
of time, which was mentioned in agreements between the Afghanistan 
and United States governments.281 In strong words, the ICOIC 
announced that the establishment of administrative detention centers is a 
clear violation of the Constitution.282 While there has not been a case of 
judicial review or interpretation of an international treaty in the 
Supreme Court, it is clear that this subject needs attention and there 
should be some clarity on how the Supreme Court exercises judicial 
review over international treaties.  
III.  PART THREE: INTERPRETATION OF THE CONSTITUTION UNDER THE 
2004 CONSTITUTION 
There are not many countries in the world that grant a single entity 
authoritative jurisdiction for interpretation of the constitution.283 This is 
partly because it poses a risk of political misuse by the requesting 
bodies, particularly the executive, to run their own agendas.284 Bulgaria, 
Hungary, and Slovakia among others are examples of countries that 
granted this authority to their constitutional courts.285 In Afghanistan, 
the subject of constitutional interpretation has undermined the concept 
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of judicial review.286 As one author writes, “[e]ventually, the intensity of 
the dispute over the power of interpretation has overshadowed the 
importance of judicial review in the Afghan constitutional order. Hence, 
Article 121 is seen as the interpretation clause, rather than the judicial 
review clause.”287 This is an accurate reflection of the politicians’ 
perception. The cases of judicial review have never created controversy 
like the decisions on the interpretation of the Constitution. It is mainly 
because the government has been accused of misusing the interpretation 
clause for legitimizing its own agenda.  
Constitutional interpretation is defined “as the process of 
constructing, establishing the meaning of and explaining a country’s 
written constitution (if there is one), other constitutional texts and other 
(unwritten) norms and principles that are of constitutional quality.”288 
When implementing the Constitution and laws, each implementing 
agency and branch of the state needs to perform a basic interpretation of 
the Constitution and laws,289 which also helps in terms of better 
implementation of the Constitution. However, authoritative 
interpretation is different and is usually conducted by an independent 
body.290 While the text of Article 121 is clear on the authority of the 
Supreme Court to interpret laws, legislative decrees, inter-state 
agreements and covenants, it is not clear enough on the subject of 
interpretation of the Constitution.  
The general understanding is that when judicial review of laws is 
conducted, the reviewing body is actually interpreting the 
Constitution.291 This was the essence of the arguments in Marbury v. 
Madison. In that case, John Marshall and the other justices of the United 
States Supreme Court argued that it is the role of the judiciary to 
determine what the proper law is by interpreting the Constitution.292 
However, not everyone has the same understanding on this matter in 
Afghanistan.  
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The landmark case of Spanta in 2007 proved there are different 
opinions on this issue and the difference of opinions by each branch 
drove the state organs to the brink of a full-fledged constitutional 
deadlock.293 To understand the importance of constitutional 
interpretation in Afghanistan, it is of critical importance to examine the 
facts and consequences of the Spanta case and other key cases of 
constitutional interpretation.  
A.  Case of Spanta 
The Constitution of 2004 authorizes Wolesi Jirga to question the 
ministers and if not satisfied with the explanations, it can cast a vote of 
no confidence to each minister separately.294 A vote of no confidence 
shall be “explicit, direct and on the basis of well-founded reasons.”295 
During May 2007, the Government of Islamic Republic of Iran urged 
the expulsions of an estimated one million Afghan refugees.296 Media 
reports about the inhumane behavior of Iranian authorities with the 
Afghan refugees at the time of deportation, resulted in mass protests in 
the country.297 There was additional criticism in the National 
Assembly.298  
Not happy with the responses from the Minister of Foreign Affairs 
and the Minister of Refugees, Wolesi Jirga decided to proceed with a 
vote of no confidence.299 Based on the formula set forth in Article 92 of 
the Constitution, 125 out of 249 Wolesi Jirga votes were required to 
oust a minister.300 Of the 197 members present in the session, 136 voted 
against the Minister of Refugees, fifty-six members voted in favor and 
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five votes were declared invalid.301 As a result, the speaker of Wolesi 
Jirga announced the dismissal of the Minister of Refugees.302 
The voting results for the Minister of Foreign Affairs followed an 
interesting round. Of all votes counted, 124 votes favored dismissal of 
the Minister, sixty-seven votes were in support of the Minister, three 
votes were declared invalid, and one vote was declared “suspicious” 
because the voter had marked both ‘Yes’ and ‘No’.”303 Controversy 
began when some MPs believed that Wolesi Jirga fell short of unseating 
Spanta by one vote, since Wolesi Jirga must consider the “suspicious” 
vote void following the prior treatment of such votes, while others 
argued that the “suspicious” vote indicated disagreement of the voter.304 
At the end of the session, the Speaker of Wolesi Jirga postponed the 
decision on the “suspicious” vote for the next meeting.305 The next 
plenary session of Wolesi Jirga did not happen until after the weekend. 
The vote of no confidence against the ministers created exciting 
discussions in the media during the weekend, and thus some members 
of Wolesi Jirga, who had been absent in the impeachment session, 
attended the second session. The number of MPs present in the session 
reached 217.306  
After some discussions, Wolesi Jirga decided to vote for a second 
time to determine the fate of the Minister of Foreign Affairs. In the 
second round of voting, seventy-three votes were in Spanta’s favor, 141 
votes were against him and while three votes were left blank; the result 
indicated a no-confidence vote.307 While accepting the impeachment of 
the Minister of Refugees, (who had a “direct working relation” to the 
issue of repatriation of the refugees), the President of Afghanistan, 
Hamid Karza, asked the Supreme Court to decide on the 
constitutionality of the Wolesi Jirga’s no-confidence vote on the 
Minister of Foreign Affairs.308 The press release by the President’s 
Office in the related section said:  
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With respect to the case of Minister for Foreign Affairs, given 
tremendous and non-stop efforts of Dr. Spanta concerning this 
compulsory repatriation of Afghan refugees from Iran, the 
President requested the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan’s 
Supreme Court to shed light and to provide its expert opinion 
on the following two issues:  
I:  Is this vote of no confidence [on the question of forced 
repatriation of Afghans from Iran] which has no direct relation 
with the mandate of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, justified 
or not? What does the Constitution of the country prescribe in 
this particular issue?  
II:  What stance does the Afghan Constitution take on the 
legality of holding two consecutive rounds of voting on the 
single issue of impeaching the Minister of Foreign Affairs? 
Taking into account the previous treatment of disputed cards 
by the Afghan Parliament [which automatically treated such 
cards as void] which of the two [round of voting] should be 
accepted?309  
Another question was asked of the Supreme Court that did not 
appear in the above press release. The question was: “how to treat the 
votes of those members of Wolesi Jirga who were not present in the 
interpellation session, but voted in the second round?”310 The Council of 
Ministers also supported the President’s request from the Supreme 
Court.311 
 In light of these issues, the press release said the President will 
decide on the case of Afghan Minister of Foreign Minister as soon as he 
receives the decision of the Supreme Court, which is the legal authority 
to interpret the Afghan Constitution.312 Until then, it added Dr. Spanta 
remains Afghanistan’s Minister of Foreign Affairs.313 
While Wolesi Jirga was on its summer recess, the Supreme Court 
answered those questions.314 However, neither the Supreme Court, nor 
any other governmental organization published the decision.315 Only the 
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spokesperson of the Ministry of Parliamentary Affairs spoke, although 
briefly, about the decision and said that the Supreme Court, in a seven-
page opinion (hereinafter Spanta), decided that the decision of no-
confidence vote of Wolesi Jirga was unconstitutional.316 
The decision of the Supreme Court in Spanta was brief and the 
legal arguments were not intricate. In the first paragraph, the Court 
articulated how the case reached the Court.317 The Court did not discuss 
whether or not it had jurisdiction over the case.318 Instead, the court 
directly quotes the three questions of the government.319 Interestingly, 
the Supreme Court then emphasized the independence of the Supreme 
Court and the role of the National Assembly,320 a practice that cannot be 
seen in the ordinary decisions of the courts in Afghanistan. The 
Supreme Court, in the opinion, used language that appeared to establish 
itself as the interpreter of the Constitution and clarified the role of each 
of the branches.321 Like a primary court, the Supreme Court requested 
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Parliamentary Affairs and 
the Office of the Secretariat of Wolesi Jirga to submit relevant 
documents to the Court.322 The Court requested the diplomatic letters 
exchanged between the governments of Afghanistan and Iran regarding 
refugees and the attendance sheet listing the members of Wolesi Jirga 
on the days of voting.323  
In response to the first question, the Supreme Court explained that 
Wolesi Jirga was similar to a national court that makes inquiries on the 
performance of ministers.324 The Supreme Court added that Wolesi Jirga 
adjudicates the guilt of the ministers, and may either tolerate the 
minister or cast a vote of no confidence if they find the minister 
guilty.325 The Court added that the decision of the national court is final 
only if the decision is based on relevant and justifiable reasons.326 
Moreover, the Court noted that the decisions should be explicit and 
clear, directly relevant to the minister’s non-performance of a specific 
duty, and should not have resulted from the actions of persons or 
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sources whom the minister does not have control over.327 The Court 
concluded that the Minister of Foreign Affairs was not competent and 
did not have control to prevent, prohibit, nor stop the government of 
Iran from expelling Afghan refugees; thus the reasons for the vote of no 
confidence were not justified.328 
In response to the second question, the Supreme Court argued that 
one suspicious vote could not invalidate the rest of the votes and it did 
not constitute the majority as required by the Constitution.329 In the 
opinion of the Court, the question of the validity of the suspicious vote 
was already resolved because of precedent set by Wolesi Jirga in similar 
circumstances, which had considered such votes void.330 The Court in its 
argument was not actually addressing a constitutional matter. 
Conversely, it was referring to internal procedures of Wolesi Jirga. 
Reference to sources other than the Constitution creates doubt as to 
whether the Supreme Court can go that far and act like an ordinary court 
in addressing issues of constitutional interpretation.  
Respectively, the Court, in response to the third question, ruled in 
favor of the President by arguing that the first round of the vote was 
valid and there was no place to reconsider the vote on the same subject 
matter.331 The Court referred to Article 65 of the Rules of Procedures of 
Wolesi Jirga, which states that after the announcement of the voting 
results on a subject matter, no further debate shall take place.332 The 
Court also noted the increase in the number of members of Wolesi Jirga 
in the second round of voting and questioned the vote of those members 
who were absent at the time of speeches of the ministers.333 In the eyes 
of the Court, the members who were not present at the time of the 
speech and related responses were not in a position to judge the 
performance of the ministers.334 A simple interpretation of this argument 
is that the Supreme Court meant that the members who were absent 
during the questioning and interpellation process should not have 
participated in the voting process. If this argument is accepted, many 
decisions of Wolesi Jirga, and for that matter Mishrano Jirga, would be 
invalid because many members do not participate in the discussions but 
do participate in the voting process.  
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Eight members of the Court signed the decision,335 without 
mentioning any dissenting opinion. Mohammad Alim Nasimi’s 
signature, the ninth member of the Court, was missing; however, 
interviews with Supreme Court officials showed that dissent does not 
happen in cases of judicial review and interpretation and the Court has 
decided unanimously thus far.336As discussed in Part II, lack of dissent 
is not a sign of strength of the Court; rather, it may evidence lack of 
independence of the Court members in their opinions and impact of 
political influence. Spanta illustrated how the constitutional 
arrangement in Afghanistan has changed and how the judiciary is 
playing a critical role in this new order. It was also a cautionary note to 
the new and inexperienced parliament of Afghanistan not to use its 
power improperly and incautiously.337  
The reaction of Wolesi Jirga to the Supreme Court’s decision was 
unsurprisingly negative.338 In the discussions that followed in the 
plenary sessions of Wolesi Jirga, several members challenged the 
authority of the Supreme Court on making decisions on a political 
matter that does not fall under jurisdiction of the Supreme Court..339 
Several members of Wolesi Jirga believed that Supreme Court works in 
favor of the executive branch.340 There were also views that the 
Supreme Court has trespassed on its constitutional authority by deciding 
a case of political nature.341 What they meant was that the case of 
Spanta was not justiciable and that the Supreme Court should not have 
accepted it in the first place.342 Besides, attention soon turned to the 
subject of constitutional interpretation. Scholars and members of the 
National Assembly posed the question of whether the Supreme Court is 
the appropriate constitutionally recognized entity to interpret the 
Constitution.343  
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Despite successive protests of Wolesi Jirga against the continuance 
of the work of the Minister of Foreign Affairs,344 the President insisted 
that the Supreme Court’s decision stand and be implemented.345 Spanta 
was an alarming case to the National Assembly and, as we have seen in 
Part II, the National Assembly proceeded to give the authority of 
constitutional interpretation to the newly established ICOIC.346 
However, the Supreme Court circumvented that move by declaring 
certain articles of ICOIC Law unconstitutional.347 
The epicenter of the controversy in Spanta was again Article 121 
of the Constitution which says: “The Supreme Court on the request of 
the Government or the courts shall review the laws, legislative decrees, 
inter-state treaties and international covenants for their compliance with 
the Constitution and provide their interpretation in accordance with the 
law.348 President Karzai believed that this article authorizes the Supreme 
Court to interpret the Constitution.”349 In a letter to Wolesi Jirga after he 
vetoed the Law on Structure and Authorities of ICOIC, President 
Karzai’s government argued that the phrase “their interpretation” in 
Article 121 of the Constitution indicated the intent of the founders of 
the Constitution to give the interpretation of laws, legislative decrees, 
treaties and international conventions and the constitution itself to the 
Supreme Court.350  
Farsi and Pashto grammar conventions suggest the word “their” in 
Article 121 is a possessive adjective and does not cover the constitution 
itself.351 If the textual interpretation of Article 121 is considered, the 
Supreme Court does not have the authority to interpret the constitution, 
though it does have the authority to interpret the laws, legislative 
documents, inter-state treaties and international conventions. However, 
merely defining a term from a grammatical point of view may be 
misleading. It is of equal importance to study the historical development 
of this article and examine the intent of the drafters. The Supreme Court 
extensively explained how Article 121 came into existence when it 
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struck down Article 8 of ICOIC Law.352 The Supreme Court also 
disregarded any opinion that stated it does not have the authority to 
interpret the Constitution but firmly mentioned that in addition to 
judicial review of laws, legislative decrees, inter-state treaties and 
covenants, it has the authority to interpret these legislative documents 
and the Constitution.353 In 2018, the draft Law on Jurisdiction and 
Organization of Judiciary, outlined one article with separate clauses that 
clarified the interpretation of the Constitution is a task of the Supreme 
Court.354 The reaction of the National Assembly is yet to be seen.  
The decision of the Supreme Court in Spanta raised some serious 
questions about the flaws of the constitutional interpretation 
mechanisms in Afghanistan. These questions can be summarized as 
below: 
(i)  Is the Supreme Court the right legal body to interpret the 
Constitution? 
(ii)  Presume the answer to the first question is “yes”. 
Impeachment of a minister is not a legal or legislative decree, 
nor is it an inter-state treaty or international treaty. So how can 
the Supreme Court decide a case like this? By interpreting the 
Constitution, can the Supreme Court invalidate the decisions 
made by the Wolesi Jirga, or any other executive entity? 
(iii)  The Supreme Court is referring to Internal Procedures of 
the Wolesi Jirga, Sharia Law principles, and criminal law 
concepts in Spanta. Referring to those instruments is only 
possible if a case is adjudicated in the lower courts or if one 
has appealed to the Supreme Court. By examining other legal 
documents, did the Court not expand its scope of jurisdiction? 
Spanta is not the only case of constitutional interpretation in 
Afghanistan. There are a number of other occasions that the Supreme 
Court interpreted the Constitution. In the following subsection, some 
key cases of interpretation are outlined.  
B.  Other Cases of Constitutional Interpretation 
1.  Addition of Name of Ethnicities in the National Identification Cards 
In 2017, President Ashraf Ghani requested his Administrative 
Office ask the Supreme Court whether it is constitutional to add more 
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ethnicities to the list of fourteen ethnicities already mentioned in Article 
4 of the Constitution regarding National Identification Cards.355 The 
Supreme Court argued there is no restriction to add more ethnicities.356  
2.  Interpellation of Ministers over Budget Expenditure 
After reviewing the 2015 expenditure report of the government, 
the Wolesi Jirga decided to impeach ministers who could not spend 
more than 70% of their development budget in 2015. As a result, seven 
ministers were disqualified.357 In the midst of the impeachment process, 
the government was quick to request the Supreme Court decide whether 
the decision of the Wolesi Jirga was constitutional or not.358  
Despite a lot of speculation that Supreme Court has endorsed 
Wolesi Jirga’s decision,359 the Supreme Court never provided a response 
to this request. Given the political nature of the request, it has been 
difficult for the Supreme Court to make such a decision though the case 
resembles that of Spanta.  
On a number of other occasions, the government asked the 
Supreme Court to make a political breakthrough when the elections 
were not organized at their constitutionally recognized timetable360 or 
when government asked the Supreme Court to find a solution how to fill 
in one third of seats of Meshrano Jirga which were vacant because 
elections for district councils were not held. The basis for these 
decisions was the authority of Supreme Court to interpret the 
Constitution.  
3.  Wolesi Jirga Request for Interpretation of Article 16 of the Afghan 
Constitution 
Based on Article 121 of The Afghan Constitution, the Wolesi Jirga 
is not entitled to request for judicial review or interpretation of the 
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Constitution;361 however, the Wolesi Jirga filed such a request for 
interpretation of Article 16 of the Constitution that emphasizes the 
preservation of scientific and administrative terminologies.362 The 
Supreme Court subsequently argued that the specific terms used for 
university professor titles and names for universities or departments 
have been in use for decades and they should be preserved since Article 
16 of the Constitution requires preservation of such terms.363  
4.  Interpretation of Laws, Legislative Decrees and Inter-State Treaties 
The Supreme Court uses three words to address the subject of 
explaining articles of the laws: (1) Towjih (justification), (2) Towzih 
(explanation), and (3) Tafsir (interpretation).364 The way the Supreme 
Court justifies or explains law articles is not different from 
interpretation. Considering that the language of Article 121 only 
mentions interpretation,365 it would have been more useful to only use 
Tafsir and avoid using other terms that create confusion.  
Cases involving the interpretation of ordinary laws have never 
been quite the issue that interpretation of the Afghan Constitution has 
been. This is due to the clear language used in Article 121 on 
authorizing the Supreme Court to interpret laws, legislative decrees, 
inter-state treaties and international covenants.366 Like cases of judicial 
review, the Supreme Court has been inconsistent and unpredictable in 
receiving and interpreting those documents. In the following 
paragraphs, an examination of a few cases of interpretation will 
illustrate the inconsistency featured in Supreme Court decisions.  
Other examples of statutory interpretation by the Supreme Court 
are outlined below:  
(i)  Article 44 of the Law on Defense Lawyers regarding the 
validity of licenses issued before enactment of that law.367 
(ii)  Article 5 of the Law on Defense Lawyers about the 
difference between a Defense Lawyer and a Dispute 
Lawyer.368 
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(iii)  Articles 10, 24, and 25 of the Nationality Law, about 
individuals born of an Afghan and a non-Afghan parent 
outside the country.369 
(iv)  Article 39 of the Law on Elimination of Violence against 
Women, about crimes against women that take place outside 
the family environment.370 This Law is in force as a legislative 
decree.  
(v)  Request of Civil Society Organizations to decriminalize 
cases of women escaping from home due to violence.371 
(vi)  Request of the Ministry of Justice to interpret the need, or 
lack thereof, to have a Family Law when the terms are 
addressed in the Civil Code.372 
(vii)  Request of the Ministry of Commerce and Industry to 
clarify the monetary punishments based on the articles of the 
Constitution.373 
(viii)  Request of the Ministry of Defense to authorize military 
courts to consider issues of corruption committed by military 
personnel.374 
(ix)  Request from the Central Bank, Pashtany Bank, and Bank 
Melli to permit the sale of collateral if the Court did not come 
to a decision within twenty days, per Article 27 of the Law on 
Mortgage of Immovable Properties in Banking Transactions. 
The Supreme Court found that Article 27 of this law was 
contrary to the Constitution, and the Court announced it as 
invalid.375  
(x)  Requests from Lower Courts to interpret ordinary laws. 
Some examples may be found below: 
•  Kunduz Appellate Court’s request to interpret different 
Articles of the Land Management Law.376 
•  Kapisa Appellate Court’s request for clarification on 
articles related to differentiating criminal and civil aspects 
of cases when the Government is involved.377 
•  Badakhshan Appellate Court’s request for clarification 
on Article 8 of the Land Management Law.378 
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•  Takhar Appellate Court’s request for guidance 
regarding the consideration of public service work, 
instead of imprisonment for criminal convictions, after 
approval from the Minister of Justice.379 
•  Badakhshan Appellate Court’s request for clarification 
on the difference between a “protest” and an “appeal” 
under the Government Cases Law.380 
While the Supreme Court had accepted a request from Civil 
Society Organizations to interpret an article of law, the Government did 
not channel a request by the Wolsi Jirga for interpretation of Article 46 
of the Higher Education Law to the Supreme Court.381 The Wolsi Jirga 
had sent a letter forwarding a complaint by a university professor on the 
misinterpretation of his promotion to the Administrative Office of the 
President, which asked it to request the Supreme Court to interpret 
Article 46 of the Higher Education Law.382 The Administrative Office of 
the President wrongfully asked the ICOIC for an interpretation. The 
ICOIC rejected the request, arguing interpretation of ordinary laws is 
within the authority of the Supreme Court.383 The Administrative Office 
of the President then asked the Supreme Court to interpret Article 46 of 
the Higher Education Law.384 The Supreme Court rejected the request, 
arguing the cabinet should approve the request first.385 The President did 
not know about the request and when he realized the matter, instead of 
referring the question to the Supreme Court, he asked the Ministry of 
Higher of Education to resolve the issue. A comparison of the process 
of how requests by Civil Society Organizations and the Wolesi Jirga 
were handled is proof that this mechanism can be arbitrary, subjective, 
and inconsistent.  
The Supreme Court has yet to receive a request for interpretation 
of treaties; however, the above examples show how government 
agencies, ordinary courts, and even Civil Society Organizations have 
been able to file their requests for an answer from the Supreme Court. 
The mechanisms in use have been inconsistent and contradictory to the 
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prior practice of the Supreme Court. A law describing the eligibility 
criteria to file cases and procedures would prevent such inconsistencies.  
5.  Role of Independent Commission on Overseeing Implementation of 
Law 
In the Constitutional Loya Jirga, Hamid Karzai pushed for a strong 
presidential system while non-Pashtun ethnic representatives 
campaigned for a parliamentary system with a constitutional court in 
which they could share power.386 Although the President succeeded in 
establishing a strong presidential system, the opposition factions 
succeeded in establishing the ICOIC on the last day of the 
Constitutional Loya Jirga.387 Thus, ICOIC is a result of compromise and 
last minute dealings in Loya Jirga.  
In its last day of work, the Loya Jirga hastily introduced and 
agreed to Article 154 of the Constitution. Thus, it did not have the time 
to stipulate to the authorities and duties of the ICOIC. Instead, it was 
foreseen that authorities of the ICOIC would be articulated by ordinary 
law.388 As Vikram Parekh, a senior analyst with the International Crisis 
Group in Kabul, one day after approval of the Constitution in January 
2004 stated in an interview: "The main challenges, I think, that lie ahead 
when it comes down to implementing the constitution–one will be just 
simply clearing up a lot of the ambiguities in the constitution."389 He 
continued, "I mean, the draft–there is a last-minute compromise in it 
that had a sort of commission for the implementation of the constitution, 
but it doesn't clarify at all what the powers of that commission are going 
to be. Conflicts between secular sources of law, like international 
human rights law and Islamic law, also need to be clarified, as well."390 
It was not until June 2010 when the ICOIC was established.391 
Moreover, as we have seen in previous sections, the Supreme Court 
butchered the ICOIC Law by invalidating selected articles.392 Not 
introducing replacement articles further added to the problem. 
Considering the Supreme Court verdict on ICOIC Law, this entity has 
the following functions:  
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(i)  Oversight on observance and implementation of the 
Constitution by the President, Government, National 
Assembly, Judiciary, Offices, and both Governmental and 
Non-governmental agencies;  
(ii)  Provision of legal advice to the President and National 
Assembly on issues related to the Constitution;  
(iii) Provision of specific proposals to the President and 
National Assembly to improve legislation related to the 
Constitution;  
(iv)  Provision of reports to the President on violations of the 
Constitution; and  
(v)  Adoption of internal procedures for the ICOIC.393  
The ICOIC Law extended the list of officials who can request legal 
advice related to the Constitution to include the President, both houses 
of the National Assembly, the Supreme Court, the Independent Human 
Rights Commission, the Independent Election Commission, and the 
Administrative Reform and Civil Service Commission.394 Despite being 
the authority to conduct judicial review, there are instances where the 
Supreme Court has sought opinions from the ICOIC on certain issues, 
although these instances have been informal.395 
The ICOIC Law sets forth the two main functions of the ICOIC: 
(1) oversight of implementation of the Constitution, and (2) provision of 
legal advice related to the Constitution.396 Neither the Constitution nor 
the ICOIC Law defines “oversight,” which also contributed to the 
weakening of the ICOIC’s authority.397 Recognizing this flaw, a number 
of amendments, including a definition of “oversight,” is under 
consideration by the ICOIC.398 
Given the fact that judicial review is within the authority of the 
Supreme Court, the existence of the ICOIC is unique. The advisory job 
of the ICOIC is somewhat similar to the advisory functions of the State 
Council in France with one difference: the French State Council advises 
the government on issues that may not be necessarily constitutionally 
related, while the ICOIC advises all branches of the State on issues 
relevant to the Constitution.399  
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The Kenyan Constitution of 2010 also established an entity with 
similar authorities to the ICOIC.400 Kenya established the Commission 
for Implementation of the Constitution, the main job of which was to 
make sure the necessary legislation was in place for the implementation 
of the Constitution after its approval in 2010.401The Kenyan 
Commission for Implementation of the Constitution was only in place 
for five years when it met all the benchmarks for implementation of the 
Constitution.402 In Kenya, a concern that the different factions 
comprising the National Unity Government would infringe on Kenyans’ 
rights helped spur the establishment of the Commission for the 
Implementation of the Constitution.403 The same concern about 
implementation of the constitution that existed in Afghanistan in 2004 
exists even today. This concern justifies an oversight body to provide 
reports on implementing the constitution, which should remain the main 
purpose of an entity like ICOIC.  
As discussed in previous sections, judicial review is not an 
inclusive process in Afghanistan. It is particularly criticized for being 
limited to requests of only the government or the courts.404 For this 
reason, ICOIC is playing an important role in providing an alternative 
remedy that is available to more institutions.405 ICOIC has issued eighty-
six legal opinions and interpretation decisions in a span of eight years.406 
Legal advice from the ICOIC does not have the same weight and value 
as Supreme Court decisions under Article 121; however, it still provides 
a chance to hear alternative views.407 
The ICOIC has undergone several phases throughout its short life. 
In the initial years after its establishment in 2010, the ICOIC played a 
critical role and, though the Supreme Court challenged its authorities, it 
continued to issue decisions on constitutional interpretation and legal 
advice related to the Constitution.408 The Supreme Court’s decision to 
declare certain articles of ICOIC Law invalid has affected the ICOIC’s 
ability to maneuver.409  
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The start of the ICOIC’s second term in 2016 coincided with 
internal conflicts between ICOIC members.410 These conflicts resulted 
in the other six members of the ICOIC unseating the Chairperson of the 
ICOIC.411 That decision and other claims triggered a period of 
instability, resulting in an intervention by the President of Afghanistan, 
who appointed a delegation to investigate the work of the ICOIC.412 
Merely assigning an outside delegation to investigate the work of the 
ICOIC was a big blow to its independence and political clout.413 For a 
long period of time in 2017 and 2018, the internal conflicts prevented 
the ICOIC from focusing on its main tasks of constitutional oversight 
and providing legal advice.  
The ICOIC published one report on the violation of the 
Constitution,414 indicating it has been unsuccessful in performing its 
main job of constitutional oversight. After a simple look into the 
activities of the ICOIC in recent years, it is not difficult to realize the 
ICOIC has given more attention to their role as a provider of legal 
advice compared to constitutional oversight.415  
In addition to the ICOIC’s ability to provide legal advice at the 
request of entities based on law, the ICOIC has exceeded its authority 
by continuing to interpret the Constitution at the request of Wolsi 
Jirga.416 For example, in 2011, Wolsi Jirga asked the ICOIC to interpret 
Article 106 of the Constitution, a demand that the ICOIC did not reject 
and, instead, provided a legal response.417 Respecting the decisions of 
the courts is a key element of democratic societies; however, the 
competition for getting more power has undermined this key aspect of 
democracy in Afghanistan. The ICOIC, which should act as the 
controller of implementing constitutionalism, has itself trespassed its 
scope of authorities.  
The ICOIC has also accepted requests for legal advice from 
entities that are not entitled to make such requests. The Ministry of 
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Justice, the Ministry of Finance among other agencies have made such 
requests, but the ICOIC did not deny them.418 Only once did the ICOIC 
remind the Administrative Office of the President that the President 
must directly authorize its Administrative Office to ask the ICOIC for 
legal advice.419 Despite the caution, the ICOIC still provided legal 
advice for the sake of cooperation.420 The ICOIC has also provided 
opinions sua sponte.421 Since this is not barred by the Constitution or 
ICOIC Law, ICOIC members believe there is no legal limitation that 
stops them from providing opinions on their own motion.422 As seen in 
the above examples, the ICOIC has been inconsistent in dealing with 
legal advice on constitutional matters by accepting requests from 
unauthorized organizations.  
The ICOIC has not only provided advisory opinions on articles of 
the Constitution, it has also provided its legal interpretation of articles 
of ordinary laws—something that is unauthorized by the Constitution. 
For instance, while providing an opinion on the invalidation of certain 
government contracts by Wolesi Jirga, the ICOIC quoted articles of the 
Procurement Law and gave its interpretation.423 International treaties are 
not spared either. The Ministry of Finance, in an official letter, asked for 
an interpretation of Article 7 of the Constitution about applying 
international treaties.424 In its legal advice, the ICOIC opined that the 
ordinary laws of Afghanistan are preferred over executive military 
agreements, and they are required to be approved by the National 
Assembly.425 These examples illustrate the competition between the 
ICOIC and the Supreme Court. However, neither organization has 
established a consistent constitutional interpretation or judicial review 
mechanism within its sphere of authority.426 Even if the requests did not 
fall under the authority of either the ICOIC or the Supreme Court, each 
provided its opinion hoping to gain more power in the political 
apparatus/structure/forum of Afghanistan.  
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The ICOIC has asserted that it has the authority to resolve conflicts 
between the branches of the State government.427 This authority is not 
mentioned in ICOIC governing law, but it seems that the ICOIC feels 
there is a gap that it needs to fill. In one case where it provided legal 
advice, the ICOIC proposed changes in the law and suggested amending 
an article of a law.428 Nevertheless, the ICOIC has failed to act as a 
mediator between the Afghan government branches. There is a strong 
need for such an independent mediator on political matters, particularly 
those which are non-justifiable.429 The ICOIC could have played a more 
positive role in that respect. However, internal conflicts have 
downgraded the ICOIC to a symbolic entity that is not seriously 
considered by the state branches.  
Despite the flaws in the ICOIC’s functional mechanisms and 
approaches, a comparative study of the legal opinions provided by the 
Supreme Court and the ICOIC shows that the ICOIC has been more 
professional and intricate in its reasoning. Particularly, in recent years, 
the ICOIC has followed a standard format, and published its opinions in 
printed and digital form on its website,430 which has been helpful in 
providing clarity to its opinions. Another critical difference is that 
ICOIC opinions reveal how its members have decided, while such a 
distinction is not possible in Supreme Court decisions. On a number of 
opinions published on the ICOIC website, some members have not 
signed on, evidencing their dissent.431 These little steps can help bring 
consistency to issues of judicial review, interpretation, and 
constitutional oversight.  
Given the availability of two venues for constitutional 
interpretation, the executive government and legislature have been 
cherry picking favorable responses to their questions, deferring to the 
Supreme Court on some occasions and to the ICOIC on others.432 For 
example, in 2011, the Council of Ministers asked for interpretation of 
Article 7 of the Constitution from the Supreme Court.433 Around the 
same time, the Ministry of Finance made a request to the ICOIC on a 
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similar matter.434 However, since the ICOIC is authorized to provide 
only non-binding legal advice, the requesting agencies, including the 
President and the National Assembly, simply ignored the opinions of 
the ICOIC in some cases.435 This trend can negatively affect the 
credibility of the ICOIC and can even drive the ICOIC members toward 
a politically-influenced decision-making process in order to attract more 
attention from the government and other parties. In addition, the 
competition between the Supreme Court and the ICOIC should finish 
and each entity should focus on its own mandate. There needs to be a 
clear legal framework negotiated by the two institutions.  
C.  Role of Ministry of Justice 
While judicial review is embedded as one of the powers of the 
Supreme Court, the Regulation on Organization of Activities of 
Ministry of Justice authorizes this Ministry to provide legal advice and 
explanations on legislative documents at the request of ministries and 
other government agencies.436 The Ministry of Justice responds to the 
requests of government agencies merely by identifying the relevant 
articles of the laws or other legislative documents. The Ministry of 
Justice does not provide detailed explanations of the law, since it does 
not want to be held accountable for encroaching on the Supreme Court’s 
jurisdiction under Article 121 of the Constitution.437  
IV.  PART FOUR: THE NEED TO REFORM JUDICIAL REVIEW 
The analysis of how judicial review and constitutional 
interpretation are conducted in Afghanistan highlights the need for 
reformed practices. Inconsistency is a common element of judicial 
review and constitutional interpretation, which has created confusion 
and prompted a strong desire for reform. Judicial review has the 
potential to reinforce institutionalization and rule of law in the young 
constitutional governments. It not only helps ensure the separation of 
powers, but also acts as a mechanism to protect citizen’s fundamental 
rights.438 Judicial review was not a familiar phenomenon in Afghanistan 
 
 434. INDEPENDENT COMM’N FOR OVERSEEING THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE 
CONSTITUTION, supra note 164, at 130.* 
 435. HARESS, supra note 5, at 37.  
 436. Regulation on Organization of Activities of Ministry of Justice, AFGHANISTAN 
OFFICIAL GAZETTE No. 350, art. 4.7 (2019) (Afg.)  
 437. Interview with Abdul Majid Ghanizada, Dir. of Legislation Inst. (Mar. 10, 2018).  
 438. Id. at 30; see also Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803). 
FINAL_FOR_JCI   5/19/2020  5:45 AM 
286 Loy. L.A. Int’l & Comp. L. Rev. [Vol. 42:2 
when the Constitution was drafted and approved in 2003 and 2004.439 
However, lessons have been learned and a redesigned model of judicial 
review to bring clarity and consistency is necessary.  
In his speech after approval of the Constitution in January 2004, 
Hamid Karzai—the then Head of Transitional Government—pointed 
out the need to revise the Constitution in the future.440 Afghanistan has 
experienced challenges in implementing its Constitution since 2004.441 
The number of times the Constitution failed to answer complicated 
questions cannot be ignored. Judicial review and constitutional 
interpretation are among those failures.442 If opportunity avails, the 
ambiguities and inconsistencies of judicial review and constitutional 
interpretation in Afghanistan should be resolved through the 
constitutional amendment process. However, other solutions should be 
sought for the short term.  
A.  Designing a Workable Model of Judicial Review for Afghanistan 
As argued in this article, judicial review requires close attention 
and reform. The following section offers two models of judicial review: 
The Supreme Court Model and the European Model. Reforming the 
current setup is necessary and applying either of the models above 
would lead to a better system of judicial review in Afghanistan.  
1.  Model One: The Supreme Court Model 
The current model of judicial review in Afghanistan only gives the 
highest organ of the judiciary, the Supreme Court, the authority of 
judicial review and interpretation of laws, legislative decrees, 
international covenants and inter-state agreements. Unless some 
important aspects of the current model are reformed, judicial review 
will remain a contentious and inconsistent subject. The following 
subsections outline aspects that need special attention and aim to 
introduce a model of judicial review that adapts to the contemporary 
context in Afghanistan and that is feasible to apply.  
Article 121 clearly establishes the authority of the Supreme Court 
to conduct judicial review of laws and legislative decrees.443 However, 
 
 439. HARESS, supra note 5, at 9. 
 440. Hamid Karzai, Head of Transitional Gov’t, Speech (Jan. 4, 2004), in SECOND VICE 
PRESIDENT OFFICIAL WEBSITE (Afg.). 
 441. KAMALI, supra note 196, at 34-35. 
 442. FARID HAMIDI & ARUNI JAYAKODY, SEPARATION OF POWERS UNDER THE AFGHAN 
CONSTITUTION: A CASE STUDY 1-2 (Kabul: Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit, 2015).  
 443. ROSE LEDA EHLER ET AL., supra note 176, at 175.  
FINAL_FOR_JCI   5/19/2020  5:45 AM 
2019] Constitutional Interpretation in Afghanistan 287 
there are not elaborate procedures in place on how to conduct judicial 
review in a consistent way. Additionally, the issue of interpretation is 
not straightforward. In Spanta, the Supreme Court referred to the 
historical records of constitution drafting and concluded that the 
Supreme Court possessed the authority to interpret the Constitution.444 
However, based on the textualism model of interpretation, which 
primarily considers the basic meaning of a text, the Supreme Court does 
not have the authority to interpret the Constitution.445  
One solution is to keep the current model of judicial review but to 
make substantial clarifications. This would be made possible by 
amending the Constitution.  
The following are some of the specific points that must be 
considered: 
(i)  Amend Article 121 in a way that clarifies that the Supreme 
Court has jurisdiction over interpretation of the Constitution. 
Additionally, it would make sense to add clear language that 
shows the ICOIC has the authority to interpret the Constitution 
as well.  
(ii)  It is of great importance to highlight the ability of the 
Supreme Court to conduct a priori review of international 
treaties.  
(iii)  The right to petition the Supreme Court to conduct 
judicial review needs to be extended to more institutions. 
Unlike some other countries in which all courts have the 
authority to review the constitutionality of laws, the judiciary 
is weak in Afghanistan.446 There are very few judges in 
Afghanistan who are intimately familiar with constitutional 
concepts.447 Therefore, it is not practical to expand this 
authority beyond the Supreme Court. However, it is important 
to make judicial review accessible to more officials and 
citizens. Institutions such as the National Assembly, the 
Independent Human Rights Commission, the Provincial 
Councils, and the ICOIC should be able to directly petition the 
Supreme Court for judicial review and to interpret the 
Constitution, laws, treaties, and conventions. In addition, it 
should be clarified that citizens can file their constitutional 
review cases in the ordinary courts, and if the court confirms 
that there is a real constitutional question, then the court may 
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refer the case to the Supreme Court. In other words, courts 
should apply concrete judicial review.  
(iv)  The Supreme Court should urgently propose a law to the 
National Assembly that regulates the procedural aspects of 
judicial review. Passing a law on this subject will bring 
consistency to the decisions concerning judicial review and 
raise awareness on how judicial review can preserve 
constitutional rights of individuals and institutions.  
(v)  Whether the Supreme Court can review compliance with 
Sharia Law needs to be clarified. Article 3 of the Constitution 
prohibits the adoption of any law that is against Sharia; 
however, it does not specify the mechanism for compliance 
with Article 3.448 It seems there is no better option except for 
the Supreme Court to ensure compliance of laws with Sharia.449 
This should also be clarified so controversy is avoided in the 
future.  
(vi)  The judges in all levels of judiciary should receive 
training on issues of constitutionality.450 This would enable the 
citizens to raise issues of constitutionality at the lower courts, 
and would allow the lower courts to effectively refer cases of 
constitutional review to the Supreme Court.  
(vii)  The judicial review and interpretation decisions should 
be available to the public. Moreover, the Supreme Court 
should publish its decisions immediately after a decision is 
made.  
(viii)  Under this scenario, the ICOIC can still survive and 
would be given even more responsibilities. The Supreme Court 
would not be able to answer political questions.451 The 
amendments of the Constitution should be designed in a way to 
allow the ICOIC to review political questions and make 
binding decisions on those matters. To ensure the 
independence of the ICOIC, members should serve for limited, 
non-extendable terms, and neither the President nor the 
National Assembly should have removal power. It is 
paramount that the ICOIC gives equal attention to its oversight 
role. Constitutional oversight is usually a complex and 
controversial subject; therefore, it is necessary to enumerate 
and clarify the ICOIC’s constitutional role. It is critical that the 
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current ICOIC law is substantially revised and amended to 
accommodate the proposed changes.  
(ix)  The Constitution should also be amended so as to 
explicitly delegate constitutional review authority to an 
institution to ensure that regulations comply with the 
governing statutes and the Constitution. Article 76 of the 
Constitution prohibits any regulation that runs against the body 
or spirit of the laws; however, it does not identify which 
institution should ensure the legality of the regulations.452 In 
many countries, administrative courts hold this authority.453 
Afghanistan is in the process of establishing administrative 
courts as part of the judiciary. If established, administrative 
courts are the most suitable entities to ensure the legality of 
regulations.  
2.  Model Two: The Establishment of a European Model of 
Constitutional Review 
The second and more preferred option for implementing judicial 
constitutional review is to establish a Constitutional Court in 
Afghanistan. Establishing an independent body not only rescues the 
judiciary from deciding political disputes, it also ensures that a 
specialized body addresses issues of constitutional compliance. The 
recent example of the Supreme Court’s hesitation in deciding the faith 
of seven ministers, whom Wolesi Jirga impeached, is proof that a 
Constitutional Court can do a better job when it comes to political 
matters. 
The Constitution must be amended to establish a specialized 
Constitutional Court. If a specialized court is instituted to decide 
constitutional matters, there will be no need for the ICOIC. It could be 
dissolved, and its responsibilities could be assigned to the Constitutional 
Court. Certain Articles, like those under the first draft of the 2004 
Constitution, could be used as the foundation for the Constitutional 
Court.  
Professional legislators should draft unambiguous provisions into 
the Constitution, creating the Constitutional Court without leaving any 
room for guesswork or interpretation. The Constitutional Court should 
be the only entity authorized to hear constitutional review matters. 
Furthermore, it should be mentioned clearly that the Constitutional 
Court not only has jurisdiction to review the constitutionality of laws, 
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legislative decrees, acts of the government, regulations, and 
international treaties, but that it also has the responsibility to interpret 
the Constitution.  
Access to the Constitutional Court is also of utmost importance. 
As described under the first scenario, it is important that access to 
judicial review mechanisms be expanded and more institutions, and 
even individuals, be able to bring their claims. At a minimum, the 
primary branches of government, a certain number of parliamentarians, 
provincial councils, the Human Rights Commission, and other 
important agencies should have access to request that the Constitutional 
Court review or interpret the Constitution and other legislative 
documents. A simplified method should also be available for 
individuals to file their cases directly with the Constitutional Court or 
other courts able to exercise concrete review by submitting questions to 
the Constitutional Court.  
Furthermore, it should be recognized that Afghanistan is 
experiencing many new constitutional questions and sometimes, 
whether due to security or financial reasons, it is not able to comply 
with all the terms of the Constitution. For instance, the government has 
not been able to hold timely elections.454 While not encouraging 
deviation from constitutional provisions, questions such as delay in 
elections, oversight of elections or abolishing political parties could also 
be addressed under the authority of the Constitutional Court.  
The proposed tasks assigned to the Constitutional Court can 
impact the constitutional and political structures of Afghanistan. Thus, it 
is essential that the members of this Court: (1) receive a vote of 
confirmation from the elected parliament and (2) have their terms of the 
members be restricted to fixed and non-extendable terms.  
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